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Abstract: Few occurrences in antiquity are as widely discussed by a diverse, ancient authorship as transcontinental 
commerce between the Mediterranean Sea and East Asia.  Yet modern historians remain profoundly divided over 
long-distance trade’s origin, operation and effect with regard to the governance of the Roman Principate.  There is 
broad consensus, however, that the volume and value of this trade consistently increased between the 
administrations of Augustus and Marcus Aurelius.  These two centuries also witness curiously divergent foreign 
policies between emperors, particularly in Rome’s Near Eastern possessions.  It is thus argued that these phenomena 
are intrinsically connected and further, that emperors considered them so in deliberating policy.  These findings 
throw light on previous topical historiography and propose a different approach to writing—and understanding—a 
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It was, no doubt, under the corrupting influence of such temptations as these, that 
our eagles achieved the conquest of the world: thus do we seek to obtain their 
patronage and sanction for our vices, and make them our precedent for using 
unguents even beneath the casque. 1 
 
--Pliny the Elder, Naturalis Historia, XIII.4 
 
When Emperor Marcus Aurelius died on the banks of the Danube in 180 CE at 
Vindobona, or Vienna, the Roman Empire he left behind was the largest transcontinental, trans-
cultural, singular political entity in history before the rise of the European nation state some 
fifteen centuries later.  It was an empire that stretched from the Thames to the Euphrates, from 
the Rhine to the Nile.  Thousands of miles from his campaign against the implacable Germanic 
tribes of the north was Rome’s second most militarily active region, the Near East comprised of 
Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and the western reaches of Mesopotamia.  To Marcus, a 
disarmingly humble Stoic despite his dictatorial power, one distinction between the two wings of 
the empire was obvious.  While the Atlantic Ocean rendered the western limits all but 
impenetrable, what lay beyond Rome’s eastern limites was not so shrouded in mystery.  Romans, 
driven by an expansionist tradition, an infatuation with Alexander’s legacy and a simple profit 
motive, were cognizant of formidable cultures that occupied the other side of the Asian steppes.  
They were even more fixated by the exotic items that arrived by ship and camelback.  Truly, the 
allure of the scarcely-known Far East made the Roman Near East, as a final departure point, that 
much more fantastic in the collective Roman imagination. 
                                                 
1
 All translations of Pliny the Elder can be found at: Crane, Gregory R.. "Perseus Digital Library." 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/ (accessed 11/9/2009). From: “Natural History”, John Bostock, 
M.D., F.R.S. H.T. Riley, Esq., B.A. London. Taylor and Francis, Red Lion Court, Fleet Street. 1855.  All 
subsequent translations are from the Loeb Classical Library. 
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 The governance of Rome’s eastern provinces in the first two centuries of the Principate 
cannot be adequately understood without a comprehensive explanation of what Romans, 
correctly or not, perceived to be the greatest threats, benefits and curiosities of the East at large.  
What were Rome’s primary interests?  To what extent did various emperors direct Roman 
legions to actively secure these interests?  How did the specter of the unknown Far East 
influence imperial administration? Was Roman interest in the region primarily commercial or 
security related?  Were commercial and security objectives separable to begin with?  Through 
careful examination of cliometric, archaeological, and literary evidence I will argue that all 
Roman priorities were secondary yet connected to the establishment, maintenance and protection 
of commerce. 
At the core of this debate is the question of how to classify Rome’s intentions when 
evidence entertains various explanations.  For example the establishment of roads, which will be 
of great import to this argument, both facilitated caravan traffic and legionary movement in 
greater Syria. Barring conclusive evidence, why should commercial or militaristic intentions be 
given privilege over the other?  I will cautiously begin from the premise that commercial 
explanations should enjoy primary consideration because of a crucial distinction—warfare 
always cost money but only occasionally paid for itself.  Whether Rome’s conquests were 
successful or not, the legions had to be paid.  Therefore, any rational emperor would have had to 
consider financial ramifications first, or risk ruffling fickle legionary feathers and inflaming 
political rivalries thereafter—by all accounts, the latter option was the Roman politician’s fastest 
route to obscurity and death.  Seeing as how military operations relied on fiscal prudence, and 
the Imperial budget was largely composed of tax revenue of commercial derivation—from 
directly taxing imports, caravan transport routes or individual “wealth”—we can reasonably 
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assert that emperors carefully considered the impacts of their foreign policy on trade.  Glory 
mongering may have satiated the Roman psyche, but it did not pay the troops.   
Part of what makes imperial intentions so difficult to parse is that most of the state’s pro-
commerce functions—building roads, extending canals, gaining control over foreign maritime 
ports—were carried out by Roman legions.  Rome’s bureaucracy did not employ a purely 
civilian workforce; nearly all government-employed citizens fell under the jurisdiction of the 
military.  As a result, when we consider the Roman military in the Near East we must recognize 
that, between numerous punctuating moments of warfare, the legions were performing other 
crucial civic duties such as infrastructural development. Had Rome built infrastructure with the 
primary purpose of easing transportation burdens in future wars, we should expect the Principate 
to have initiated hostilities along the Euphrates on at least one occasion over two centuries.  But 
no such instance occurs from the reign of Augustus through that of Marcus Aurelius.   
This is not to suggest that the series of wars Rome fought against the Parthian empire do 
not deserve added emphasis in weighing intentions—they do. Nevertheless, prewar and postwar 
periods are crucial to understanding imperial commercial strategies that took decades to bear 
fruit.  As the emperor dictated foreign policy, it necessarily follows that these strategies for 
encouraging commerce are reflected in Rome’s dealings with foreign entities.  The personalities 
of individual emperors—a facet of inquiry that makes some scholars skittish—obviously 
influenced policy directly and thus requires continued attention.  With these personages in mind, 
it is possible to evaluate the trends we find across administrations, so that we might formulate 
more ambitious propositions about the “commercial history” of Rome and, in doing so, suggest 
how scholars might approach these murky historiographical waters more confidently in the 
future.   
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This thesis will argue that this succession of emperors, both in extended peace and 
sporadic war, directed foreign policy to promote commerce in Roman Syria, Arabia, Egypt and 
beyond.  The notion of Far Eastern exotica, amplified by elitist authorship and tangible products, 
played a considerable role in inflating Roman geopolitical aspirations in the region.  
 We are immediately confronted by the fact that Roman primary source material is 
fractured, scattered, biased, and often unreliable.  This leaves considerable room for 
interpretation and disagreement among even the most eminent scholars.  As this thesis attempts 
to draw conclusions that span from the economic to the political the historiography is not easily 
compartmentalized.  Roman historians universally acknowledge that a great deal of variance and 
incongruity exists between specific eras, regions, provinces and familial dynasties.  But past this 
recognition of complexity, few arguments go uncontested.   
 With regard to issues and problems of economics in the empire, historians generally 
gravitate to one of two schools of thought: the primitivist camp (which rallies around Moses 
Finley’s The Ancient Economy of 1973) and the modernist camp (which prefers Michael 
Rostovtzeff’s Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire of 1957).  Though differences 
between both sides of the debate have been largely sensationalized, there are fundamental 
differences in opinion that ought to be expounded here.2  The primitivist camp asserts that the 
Roman economy was solidly cellular, based mostly in self-sufficient local units, with little 
discernible growth over centuries.  It further contends, “modern concepts of economic analysis 
                                                 
2
 For a discussion of this debate and its revision, see: Saller, Richard. “Framing the debate over growth in 
the ancient economy”. The Ancient Economy: Evidence and Models. J.G. Manning, Ian Morris. Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2005.  For the original texts, see: Finley, Moses. The Ancient 
Economy. Updated ed. Sather Classical Lectures. 43, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. 
And: Rostovtzeff, Michael I. Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire. 2nd ed. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998, c 1957. 
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designed for capitalist industrial economies are inappropriate for antiquity.”3 The modernist 
camp rejects the primitivist view as overly static.  Modernists are more supportive of the notion 
of markets most strongly on a local scale, somewhat on a regional scale (peripheries of urban 
centers), and least potently on an transimperial scale.  They typically prefer conclusions that 
highlight demonstrable growth and interconnectedness across the Mediterranean and beyond. 
Recent attempts to synthesize these two schools have yielded some helpful insights.  
First, any analysis of the economy of the Roman Empire in its entirety over five centuries is 
likely to eschew local economic realities.   Some regions—such as the Near East in the first two 
centuries of the Principate—experienced rapid growth in different eras and require focused 
analysis to discern what makes them exceptional.  Second, the debate shows that the term 
‘economic growth’ can be used on a per capita and aggregate basis, and the two should not be 
conflated.  Surveys of different provinces show growth in population, productivity and aggregate 
production across provinces in the early empire.4  However consequential to the growth rate of 
the Roman economy at large, these blips of accelerated regional growth appear to have 
precipitated significant changes in diplomacy in their respective theaters.  The Near East, I shall 
argue, is instructive of this truism.  In an empire ruled by a rigid hierarchy, we ought to ask, 
“what are the policies that allowed for these marked changes?”  In the Roman Near East, the 
dynamics of the luxury trade with the Far East is inextricable from any appropriate response. 
Macroscopic economic theories aside, more ideological debates exist between scholars 
when conversation shifts to expansionist efforts, particularly in the Eastern provinces. Can it be 
accurately asserted that Rome’s millennium-long conquest of geographically disparate locales 
was dictated primarily by a cult-like ideology, or are military expeditions more readily explained 
                                                 
3
 Manning & Morris, Ancient Economy,224. 
4
 Lo Cascio Elio. "The Roman Principate: the Impact of the Organization of the Empire on Production" 
Cambridge Philological Society 26, no. (2000): 78. 
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by complex practical concerns?  Particular conquests of certain regions entertain more 
diversified debate concerning precipitating factors.  The conquest of the Nabataean Kingdom by 
Trajan in 106 CE, for example, presents an example where a plethora of theories are suggested.  
Explanations of what prompted Rome’s rapid conquest of Arabia include: imperial grand 
strategy (to conquer for glory), administrative necessity (to “tidy up” a difficult region), security 
necessity (to protect interior Roman provinces), commercial potential (to promote trade), and 
imperial insecurity (to shore up support for unpopular politicians), among quite a few others.  
But these past attempts to divine Roman intentions in the Near East are all suspect in one way or 
another.  Theories that privilege a single impetus are often too narrow in scope to provide more 




 Conversely, the tendency among historians to hedge theoretical bets by presenting an 
array of possible explanations is often utterly unsatisfying.  Profuse iterations of “perhaps”, 
“maybe”, and defeatist proclamations that historians will “always” be ignorant of some facts 
(commonplace in larger, composite histories) can imbue the reader with a sense of passivity.  In 
constructing a similarly difficult narrative, Charles Darwin wrote that “any one whose 
disposition leads him to attach more weight to unexplained difficulties than to the explanation of 
a certain number of facts will certainly reject my theory.”5  Though this analogy of course has its 
limits, natural history and Roman history nonetheless share the malady of incomplete 
archaeological evidence—we would do well to espouse Darwin’s view, and to consider the 
corpus of positive evidence while still acknowledging silences and shortcomings.  This is an 
exercise in both deductive and inductive reasoning. 
 A single, market-relevant imperial action—be it taxation, public expenditure or 
coinage—could, and often did, have overlapping beneficiaries.  The logic is as follows: investing 
in efficient infrastructure, around Rome’s borders, directly facilitated the business of private 
merchants, thus promoting general goodwill in a given area.  The increased capacity of a locale 
for commerce allowed for higher volumes of goods to be exchanged at a faster rate.  Roman 
officials then collected more revenue both intermittently (with the sporadic arrival of foreign 
imports) and statically (from the annual wealth tax) to fund further operations.  Vibrant 
commerce ensured that political and ethnic tensions, ever a threat in the politically, ethnically 
and linguistically fractured Near East, remained at a lull. 
The above hypothetical is meant to introduce the reader to the basic dynamic between 
empire, province and market that we will encounter in various forms across two centuries of 
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Roman colonization.  I encourage the reader to approach the historical phenomena I will present 
with a cutting skepticism—bear in mind that every sweeping historical trend can be explained by 
a litany of causes.  But it does not follow from this reality that we should give all theories equal 
footing.  We should picture ourselves fitting these causes into a loose hierarchy based first on 
evidence and second on theoretical viability.  Which withstand our scrutiny?  Which lose 
credibility after some rudimentary process-of-elimination?  When confronted with an ambiguous 
record, it is far more fruitful (not to mention interesting) for historians of antiquity to construct a 
plausible narrative for a particular argument—a cogent reconstruction of all pertinent concrete 




This thesis aims to present the heretofore-unarticulated comprehensive argument in 
support of a commerce-dominated Roman foreign policy in the first two centuries.  The nature of 
the argument requires that sometimes-ethereal commercial trends be situated in a framework of 
cathartic military events.  This framework is divided into five periods corresponding to imperial 
administrations: Augustus (27 BCE – 14 CE), Vespasian (69-79 CE), Trajan (98-117 CE), 
Hadrian (117-138 CE), and Marcus Aurelius (161-180 CE).  In addition to including seminal 
moments of militaristic confrontation with Rome’s Near Eastern neighbors, these periods feature 
emperors of profound impact, unique disposition and considerable longevity.   
Given this uneven chronology, it is necessary here to enumerate the methods of argument 
I will employ in subsequent chapters.  The first approach is cliometric.  Applying statistical data 
is essential to constructing a plausible explanation of a complex phenomenon, and will thus 
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guide this thesis where applicable (e.g., an analysis of Julio-Claudian coin frequency, or the 
application of a pertinent medieval economic model).  The second approach is archaeological.  
Given the commercial focus of the argument, infrastructural remains—their frequency, location, 
time period and inscriptional dedications—provide an incomplete yet invaluable snapshot of 
actual physical structures from varying periods.  The existence of such remains, like the Via 
Nova Traiana from the Gulf of Aqaba to Antioch, begs the question of their origin and purpose. 
Local finds can illustrate regional realities.  The third approach is literary.  Roman historians 
benefit greatly from the swaths of literary texts that have survived the past two millennia.  
Though surely biased and incomplete, the works of Pliny, Suetonius, Fronto, Cassius Dio and 
Herodian among others, help to corroborate ambiguous cliometric and archaeological evidence.  
At the very least, these accounts provide excellent samplings of the elite mentality at any given 
time.  Statistical estimates of the size and distribution of the Roman economy—surely 
speculative and varied, yet instructive nonetheless—suggest beyond reasonable doubt that elites 
had disproportionately large exposure to and influence on commerce.   
While we would do well to avoid taking elite literary records at face value if we were 
studying, say, literacy rates among the Syrian peasantry, some lofty-minded accounts are quite 
applicable to gauging imperial attitudes toward Far Eastern luxury by simple proximity.  
Whether accurate or not, these authors reflect the biases and tastes of the entrenched senatorial 
and equestrian classes—citizens who wielded considerable clout over private industries, 
provincial offices, and imperial policy.  We should not discount the potential effect that historical 






 The phenomenon of transcontinental trade is not confined to the Roman period.  Though 
the volume and frequency of commerce between the Mediterranean world and the Far East 
undoubtedly reached its height under the unified empire, inklings of the trade had begun before 
Rome conquered Italy and would continue after its demise, albeit at anemic rates. 6  As this thesis 
will examine the intersection of politics and commerce in the Roman period, it is first essential to 
establish a cursory political and commercial history of the Eastern Mediterranean (Syria, 
Mesopotamia, the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt) before Roman rule.  The importance of the stark 
differences between political entities in these periods will become more apparent as I detail 
Roman geographical expansion chronologically in the body of this argument.  
 
                                                 
6
 Woolf convincingly defends the notion of economic integration under the empire. Woolf, Greg. 
“Imperialism, Empire and the Integration of the Roman Economy,” World Archaeology, Vol. 23, No. 3, 
Archaeology of Empires (Feb., 1992), 283-293.   
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 Long before Julius Caesar installed Cleopatra as monarch of Egypt in 47 BCE, the 
Eastern Mediterranean was ruled by a collection of localized Hellenic and Semitic kingdoms.  
Alexander’s once sprawling conquests, stretching from Macedon to the Indus, had since 
fractured among his inheritors—notably, Seleucus of Babylon and Ptolemy of Egypt.  By 312 
BCE, Seleucus had established his namesake Seleucid kingdom in the northern reaches of Syria, 
stretching eastward to the Hellenized urban centers Alexander established beyond the Euphrates 
and Tigris.  Seleucus’s rival Ptolemy usurped the Egyptian Pharaoh’s throne shortly thereafter, 
claiming dominion from the Nile to Palestine to southern Syria.  The Ptolemaic kingdom adopted 
Egyptian customs into the Hellenic chassis, an example that later Roman occupiers would follow 
quite closely.  Between these two remnants of the Alexandrian conquests remained a 
constellation of localities and minor “client” kingdoms, so-named because of their dependence 
on the patronage of more powerful monarchs.  The Nabataean, Hasmonaean and Ituraean 
kingdoms maintained sovereignty over large areas bordering the Hellenic kingdoms, 
problematizing Ptolemaic and Seleucid claims to Palestine, Sinai and the Negev desert.7   
The 250 years that followed witnessed the decline of Hellenic dominance as rivalries 
between competing Macedonian factions left their tenuous frontiers prone to foreign meddling.  
Local power shifts and territorial disputes exposed a region that was remarkably heterogeneous 
in ethnic, linguistic and political identities.  As we will see, this fracture made it simply 
impossible for any one political entity to harness the economic potential of the region—despite 
                                                 
7
 For a full survey, see: Van Der Spek, Robartus J. “The Hellenic Near East”. The Cambridge Economic 
History of the Greco-Roman World. 1st ed., Volume 1. Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris and Richard Saller. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.  For closer examination, see: Van Der Spek, Robartus J. 
“The Seleucid State and the Economy”; Foraboschi, Daniele. “The Hellenic Economy: Indirect 
Intervention by the State”; Rathbone, Dominic. “Ptolemaic to Roman Egypt: the Death of the Dirigiste 
State?” Cambridge Philological Society 26, no. (2000): 27-55. 
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its ideal geographical situation at the crossroads of three continents and the confluence of major 
maritime arteries.  
Two rising entities on the fringes of this geopolitical intermingling gravitated toward this 
promising intersection —Rome from the west and Parthia from the East.8  The Parthian Empire 
would become the perennial thorn in Rome’s side, and it deserves some exclusive attention here.  
Once an obscure nomadic tribe, the Parthians traced their existence back to 247 BCE when they 
were founded by an Iranian dynasty known as the Arascids.9  They benefited greatly from the 
Mesopotamian geopolitical instability described above, consolidating power in northern Iran 
before steadily expanding westward for the next century or so.  Under King Mithridates II, the 
Parthians finally wrested primacy in the region from the deteriorating Seleucids to the west and 
the Scythians to the East—by roughly 130 BCE, all the land between Roman and Indian control 
was subject to unified political control.  Consequentially, the storied Silk Road’s caravan traffic 
between the Far East and the Mediterranean operated on Parthian terms, tempered by Parthian 
taxes.  Parthia’s capital at Ctesiphon, symbolically located across the Tigris from the old 
Seleucid capital, was poised to reap the benefits of a politically monolithic central Asia.     
The effects of this realignment were not local.  Traders as far away as China took notice 
of what unified central Asia could do to ease market efficiencies.  Chinese archives report its 
famous traveler Chang K’ien spent considerable time in Parthian Bactria in 128 BCE.10  Shortly 
thereafter, Emperor Wu-Ti of the Han dynasty sent an embassy to the Parthian capital, bearing 
                                                 
8
 Julius Caesar planned an invasion of Parthia before his death. 
9
 There is dire need for a new, revised monograph on Parthian history. See: Debevoise, Neilson C. A 
Political History of Parthia. 1st ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938; Colledge, Malcolm 
A.R.. The Parthians. Ancient Peoples and Places. 59, Glyn Daniel. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1967, 36-56. 
10
 Hirth, Friedrich. “Story of Chang K’ien,” JAOS, XXXVI (1917), 89-107.  On the date, see: ibid., 135. 
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ostrich eggs and, curiously, a paraplegic entertainer as tokens of common interest.11  The 
importance of this cross-cultural meeting cannot be understated, particularly in considering later 
Roman intentions in the same region.  At the very least, it tells us that macroscopic commercial 
information reached entities at tremendous distances.  The Han court at Chang’an stood no less 
than 5,800 km from the Parthian capital at Ctesiphon—a long, arduous journey through the 
central Asian steppes and China’s unforgiving western desert.  Conversely, a robust Roman 
presence had already existed only 1100 km away from Cteisphon along the Mediterranean coast 
for decades when the Republic forced the Seleucids to forfeit nearly all of Asia Minor after the 
decisive Battle of Magnesia in 189 BCE.  Sheer distance aside, the Ctesiphon-Mediterranean 
route had the added advantage of the Euphrates and Orontes rivers to make movement all the less 
cumbersome.  As will be detailed later, it is only logical to contend that the information flowing 
east along Eurasia’s most important commercial artery flowed west by at least a fraction of the 
distance.    
The origins of commercial evolution were not restricted to Seleucid-Parthian territory in 
Mesopotamia.  Nor was it restricted to terrestrial trade.  The Seleucids’ cousins in Egypt, the 
Ptolemies, took a decidedly maritime approach to developing their eastern commercial 
networks.12  One of the most intriguing and fruitful documents of the Hellenic Near-East has far-
reaching implications for the Roman period that followed.  The Periplus Maris Erythraei has 
tantalized the imaginations of ancient historians for centuries.  An invaluable primary document, 
the Periplus is our best-preserved, most lucid first hand account of the maritime trade routes 
between the Red Sea and the Indian subcontinent which date as far back to the Bronze Age, 
                                                 
11
 Debevoise, Political History of Parthia, 41-44. 
12
 Manning, J.G. “Hellenistic Egypt”. The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World. 1st 




though their rapid upswing in commercial volume is concomitant with that of the Silk Road.13  It 
is a reference handbook of sorts for mercantile activity between continents, made possible by the 
second century BC discovery of seasonal monsoon winds in the Indian Ocean, whereby a voyage 
that had taken three years was winnowed to one.14  The author is undoubtedly a Hellenic 
Egyptian, explicitly using the term “we have” to modify the trees he refers to in Egypt.15  The 
original work had been dated from 230 BCE to 30 CE until Bowersock ascertained a later date of 
50 CE by analyzing the nomenclature used to describe contemporary Nabataean kings.16  The 
knowledge therein, however, is clearly the culmination of centuries of commercial seamanship.17   
                                                 
13
 Ratnagar, Shereen. Trading Encounters: From the Euphrates to the Indus in the Bronze Age. 2nd ed. 
Oxford India Collection. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, 20-26 & 256-268. 
14
 Strabo attributes this discovery to the sailor Eudoxus in 116 BC (2.98-99).  The author of the Periplus, 
however, says the discoverer was Hippalus.  Casson has suggested that Hippalus may have been the 
helmsman for Eudoxus.  Casson, Lionel. Periplus Maris Erythraei. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1989, 241-244. Cf. Schoff, Wilfred H.. The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea. New York: 
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912. 
15
 “hmin” See: Casson, PME , 242; 29.9.27. 
16
 Bowersock,G.W.. Roman Arabia. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983, 70-72. 
17
 De Romanis has shown that the identity of this particular wind’s (ζεϕυρος, or zephyr connoting the 
southwesterly seasonal monsoon wind that made long distance trade possible) discoverer remains in 
doubt.  Still, all literary evidence is “further proof of the solid basis for the commercial relations between 
Egypt, Southern Arabia and India in the late Hellenistic age.” De Romanis, Federico. "Hypalos: Distances 
and Winds Between Arabia and India in the Hellenistic Knowledge." A Gateway from the Eastern 




As is to be expected with any document of the period, difficulties in translating, and thus 
applying its content elsewhere, are legion.  In this regard, the Periplus is exemplary of the 
greater corpus of literary material from the era—the manuscripts we refer to today are certainly 
not original to the times they detail.  Our version of the Periplus, for example, was transcribed in 
the tenth century and now rests in Heidelberg, many miles and years away from its origin in the 
Red Sea.  Luckily, the Periplus had but a few linguistic ambiguities that were recently clarified 
by eminent Roman historian Lionel Casson.18  Not all difficulties in translation, however, are to 
be lamented.  Paradoxically, part of what lends credibility to the author of the Periplus is his 
colloquial and business-savvy style of the colloquial Greek, koinê.  The narrative features 
mercantile terminology and stylistic repetitions that are commonly found in personal commercial 
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 Casson, PME: 5-6.   
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documents—something of a businessman’s diary.19  As such, while certain proper nouns 
(referring to port cities, for example) may not escape our speculation, the authenticity of the 
document does not.  
While a precious literary source to be sure, the Periplus is not our best evidence of 
Ptolemaic infatuation with the Far East.  The author certainly helps to corroborate geographical 
locations along the Egyptian and Arabian coasts, but we have sufficient archaeological evidence 
to assert that the Ptolemaic pharaohs themselves founded strategic port cities around the Red 
Sea.  Ptolemy II (309-246 BCE) and Ptolemy III (?-222) founded Myos Hormos, Koptos, and 
Berenike as mercantile outposts along the Egyptian coastline to the straights of Bab-el-Mandeb 
and the Ethiopian coast.20  Hellenic papyrological remains at these sites and other sites further 
inland, preserved fortuitously by the arid climate, depict a pre-Roman Egypt with vibrant trading 
houses and an entrenched mercantile class to finance them.   
Few documents from the ancient world convey a more fascinating image than the Muziris 
papyrus, found in Egypt in 1985.  Probably written a century after the Periplus, this papyrus 
relates a legal agreement between two Red Sea merchants, one of whom owned the cargo of a 
commercial ship from the southern Indian point of Muziris.21  The second merchant agrees to 
unload and transfer the cargo across Egypt’s eastern desert to the Nile and down the great river 
to the metropolis of Alexandria, with a loan and insurance agreement of course.  More 
exceptional than the fairly sophisticated legal agreement is the breathtaking volume and value of 
                                                 
19
 Obbink, Dirk. "Oxyrhynchus Online: Imaging Papyri Project, University of Oxford." 
http://www.papyrology.ox.ac.uk/POxy/copyright/copyright.html (accessed 1/11/10). 
20
 Strabo, Geographica 2.3.3-5.  N.B.: All translations of Strabo come from Volume VII of the Loeb 
Classical Library, 1932. See also Casson, PME: 35-39. 
21
 Much ink has been spilled on this document since its discovery.  For the best summary, see: De 
Romanis, Federico. "Commercio, metrologia, fiscalità. Su P. Vindob. 40 822 verso." Mélanges de l’école 
française de Rome 110, no. 1 (1998): 11-60.  See also : De Romanis, Federico. Cassia, Cinnamomo, 
Ossidiana. 1st ed. Rome: L'Erma di Bretschneider, 1996, 167-202. 
 19 
 
the luxury cargo the Hermapollon carried.  Between fabrics, Gangetic nards and ivory, estimates 
a total value of 1,154 talents and 2,852 drachmas—a colossal sum of 27.7 million sesterces.22  
Moreover this number reflects only three of six parcels attested to by the authors—the cargo of 
the Hermapollon can reasonably be valued at 50 million sesterces.  This is many, many times the 
property qualifications necessary to be a Roman senator.23 
It is important to note that the generations of elite Roman historians that would write 
gushing accounts of the riches of the Far East were by no means as geographically savvy as the 
author of the Periplus.  Neither sailors nor adventurous merchants themselves, the intelligentsia’s 
concept of what lay beyond the Tigris and Arabian Sea was hazy at best.  What is today 
Afghanistan was often confounded with India proper.  There was a general ignorance of India’s 
interior and how it is connected to China. The unguent-rich coast of southeastern Arabia is prone 
to confusion with the Ethiopian coast.  Strabo (63 BCE – 24 CE), commenting decades before 
the Periplus was written, was both prescient and self-defeating when he wrote: 
But it is necessary for us to hear accounts of this country with indulgence, for not 
only is it farthest away from us, but not many of our people have seen it; and even 
those who have seen it, have seen only parts of it, and the greater part of what 
they say is from hearsay; and even what they saw they learned on a hasty passage 
with an army through the country.  Wherefore they do not give out the same 
accounts of the same things, even though they have written these accounts as 
though their statements had been carefully confirmed.  And some of them were 
both on the same expedition together and made their sojourns together, like those 
who helped Alexander to subdue Asia; yet they all frequently contradict one 
another.  But if they differ thus about what was seen, what must we think of what 
they report from hearsay?24 
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The resounding sense of awe is unmistakable.  While maintaining skepticism toward the specific 
details claimed by each author, we will come to see that this Orientalist contagion transcends 
generations of Roman elite authorship.  In the face of ignorance of the Far East, these 
‘enlightened’ Romans often preferred flowery optimism to cold rationale.     
Strabo’s moment of clarity notwithstanding, we can be sure of some things—particularly, 
the ways merchants traveled between both ends. It is generally accepted that products came and 
went via one of three routes.  First, the Silk Road through central Asia presented the only 
plausible overland route to the Far East, though it required considerable resources for sustenance 
and protection from commonplace bandits.25  Second, an analogous route followed the trajectory 
of the Silk Road before cutting south to the Persian Gulf and across the sea to the western coast 
of India.  The third route meandered southward along the Egyptian or western Arabian coasts 
before embarking from small port towns for the long, treacherous sea journey to India—an 
endeavor that required exceptional knowledge of the Indian Ocean’s monsoon cycle. The most 
prominent trade routes under Ptolemaic, Seleucid and Parthian rule remained so under Roman 
domination, again suggesting a fair amount of intercultural transmission through commerce.  It 
appears no coincidence that a succession of Roman emperors would exercise, in various forms, 
both hard and soft power to draw terminals of each network into its sphere of influence.  
The rhetoric that disseminated cultural fascination with the Far Eastern trade in Rome is 
unmatched by pre-Roman authors.  Yet Mediterranean tastes for Far Eastern products predate 
Rome’s hegemony by centuries.  So what were these goods that compelled pre-Roman polities to 
establish permanent trade relations with the Far East?   
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Without doubt, the primary focus of Far Eastern commerce was luxury goods.  The 
author of the Peiplus, for example, ran a decidedly high-class operation without a single 
mundane item in his hull.  His cargo is as illustrious as Pliny might have hoped for—ivory, 
rhinoceros horn, Indian myrrh, cinnamon, indigo, turquoise, onyx, silk, pearls, Chinese pelts, a 
whole host of gems and even Malaysian tortoise shells.26  Add to this list more oft-overlooked 
products, whose mentioning in ancient texts suggests their market relevance: Asiatic peach, 
liquorice, poisons and their antidotes.27  This astounding collection of sumptuous products must 
have been awe-inspiring to any Roman, if only as a sign of privilege.  The burdensome τεταρτη 
or Hellenic quarter-tax, which imposed a 25% duty on cargo from eastern trade routes, does not 
seem to have disrupted luxury demand.  It thus follows that the tetartones who assessed the 
Hermapollon at Alexandria probably collected around 12.5 million sesterces.  This tax payment 
alone was enough for a man to be deemed a senator twelve times over.  Even more stupefying is 
that the cargo, if valued at 50 million sesterces, could have financed the construction of the 
aqueduct at Alexandria Troas nearly twice over.28   
But the Far Eastern trade was not simply composed of virtually untenable riches—staple 
products were certainly present, bolstering the notion that these routes held social importance 
separate from the corporeal desires of the elites. More affordable goods were also imported at 
considerable rates, at times in tandem with expensive exotica.  Arabian and Axumite 
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frankincense, Far Eastern botanicals, and a cornucopia of peppers were mainstays not only in 
Near Eastern consumption, but across the Roman Empire.29 
Moreover, some goods from the alleged Far East became not only commonplace but 
embedded in Roman cultural institutions.  In Roman Britain, for example, there is 
incontrovertible evidence of peppers at fort under the reign of Vespasian, attested to by tablets 
bearing the fort’s inventory.  The quantity of pepper at Vindolanda remains unclear, though we 
can be reasonably certain of a price around eight sesterces.30  First, this demonstrates the cultural 
ubiquity of some eastern products, reaching to the furthest corners of the empire for culinary 
usage early in the first century—even among those employed by the state.  Second, basic supply-
and-demand suggests the extremely high quantity of Indian peppers in the empire to demand 
such a low price as far away as Britain, especially for legionaries who earned many times this 
amount in a single year.  The orient’s largesse was not proprietary of the Roman intelligentsia.    
Pliny, in his dedication to the Emperor Vespasian, remarks “the country people, and, 
indeed, some whole nations offer milk to the Gods, and those who cannot procure frankincense 
substitute in its place salted cakes.”31  This passage clearly reflects a normative expectation that 
ritual dedications to deities sometimes required the use of specific substances.  Frankincense, and 
thus the merchants who carried it from southern Arabia, had a cultural permanence to the masses 
as well.  The Roman government, under which the author if the Periplus writes, legislated as 
much—Kane on the Arabian coast had, per government mandate, a monopoly on frankincense 
exports to Rome.32   
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Imperial meddling with the Eastern commerce was, under at least some circumstances, as 
much a function of the emperor’s personal benevolence as his political authority.  The physician 
Galen, recalls that the emperor’s amici—a designation that connotes both personal and 
professional alliance—often petitioned the emperor for cinnamon for use in medicines.33  Such 
abject imperial intervention is hardly commonplace in the historical record, but it demonstrates 
the degree of attention Rome paid to eastern imports on at least two occasions, and suggests a 
similar mentality in other contexts.  The same ships that brought silks for Egypt’s praefectus also 
brought aromatics for the “country people,” making the Far Eastern trade a truly societal 
institution.   
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Before moving on to discuss imperial careers, it is necessary to present basic statistical 
data about the Roman economy at large.  That economic projections of antiquity are speculative 
by nature ought to engender caution, but not callous apprehension—they are founded, some 
more reliably than others, in facts.34  More importantly, they allot to the Roman historian a realm 
of possibilities to work within, providing a sense of finite scale in the midst of abstractions.35  In 
the case of GDP, this scale is rather broad.  Hopkins charted a low-point of 9 billion sesterces, 
whereas Duncan-Jones proposed an optimistic 20 billion sesterces.  For our purposes, it will 
suffice to split the difference, putting GDP at 14.5 billion sesterces.  Seen in this light, the cargo 
of the Hermapollon alone comprises 1/300th of Roman GDP for an entire year.36  
Concerning the size and wealth of the elites, Goldsmith has estimated that the 600 
families of the senatorial class represented .04% of the population of 55 million and .6% of total 
national income.37  More recently Scheidel proposed, quite differently, that the elite comprised 
1.5% of population and 20% of GDP.38  Note that while these projections differ wildly in 
absolute terms, the primary estimates are almost equally proportional to the secondary 
estimates—Goldsmith’s elite’s share of total income is 15 times its share of population, while 
Scheidel’s elite’s share of GDP is 13.3 times its share of population.  Put this way, the two 
estimates can be tentatively reconciled as a way to conceive wealth distribution in the Roman 
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Near East.  While casting a skeptical eye toward numerical values, we should retain heuristics 
like these for their comparative value. 
For our purposes, Goldsmith’s second estimate paints a more fulfilling picture of 
economic reality under the High Empire.  He proposes that the wealthiest 3% of the population 
received 20-25% of total national income.39  This theoretical 3% consumed the majority of 
luxury products imported by Far Eastern trade routes, controlled all political appointments and 
most means of production, and produced almost every historical literary document that survives 
to the present.  It is due to this conflation of power and influence that the Roman elite—the 
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Augustus & Defining Dirigisme 
Now that all the races of the west and south were subjugated, and also the races of 
the north, those at least between the Rhine and the Danube, and of the East 
between the Cyrus and the Euphrates, the other nations too, who were not under 
the rule of the empire, yet felt the greatness of Rome and revered its people as the 
conqueror of the world. For the Scythians and the Sarmatians sent ambassadors 
seeking friendship; the Seres41 too and the Indians, who live immediately beneath 
the sun, though they brought elephants amongst their gifts as well as precious 
stones and pearls, regarded their long journey, in the accomplishment of which 
they had spent four years, as the greatest tribute which they rendered; and indeed 
their complexion proved that they came from beneath another sky.42 
--Florus, Epitoma: 2.34.61-66 
 Augustus’s founding of the Roman Empire is concomitant with a surge in the volume and 
value of commerce between the Near East and the Far East—a trend that would continue for 
some two centuries.  Naturally, we must ask what precedents, policies and power relationships 
he implemented that precipitated this vast commercial growth.  Monitoring the trajectory of more 
empirical foreign policy trends that evolve between Augustus and Marcus—in provincial 
administrative organization (and its accompanying monetary implications), border location, and 
military operation—will provide the necessary contrast for proposing less empirical theories on 
imperial approaches to commercial policy.   
 Understanding the myriad changes that Augustus established in shifting from republic to 
empire is crucial to grasping how later emperors conceived of direct economic power, or 
dirigisme.  Vespasian, Domitian, Trajan, Hadrian and Marcus Aurelius all mixed and matched 
the executive’s component abilities—territorial expansion (and contraction), monetary 
recalibration and infrastructural development, among others—in the shadow of Augustan 
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precedent of promoting international commerce at large.  In short, he made imperial provinces 
into a sort of laboratory where policies could be dictated and tested over decades.    
 The new emperor immediately annexed Egypt as a province. 43   This was but a small part 
of a greater political realignment, wherein Augustus forged an official distinction between 
senatorial provinces and imperial provinces.  In the senatorial provinces, located in the 
developed interior, Republican business would go on much as usual.  But rather than allow rival 
senators governance of volatile fringe provinces, Augustus began a policy of direct imperial 
appointment name, installing a praefectus as his direct liaison and official governor.  Other 
functions of the traditional Republican bureaucracy in the provinces, most notably that of 
minting official coinage, transferred to emperor-approved legati.  With political empire came no 
small degree of economic imperialism.   
 What prompted such reform?  After the watershed Battle of Actium, Augustus was 
confronted with the problem of an inflationary currency, partly so because of extended civil war.  
In the last fifty years of the republic, the golden aureus had depreciated some 33% 
problematizing post-war commerce and debt repayment.44  Decisive action was necessary.  
Augustus responded by ordering the creation of the fiscus Caesaris—a de facto proprietary 
imperial treasury distinct from the Senate’s aerarium populi Romani—to swiftly restore 
solvency to the market.  Not coincidentally, the provinces of Syria and Judaea joined Egypt 
under the umbrella of direct imperial patriarchy.  Smaller reforms on a local level reinforced the 
imperial paradigm shift.  Citing financial constraints, the emperor cut state expenditures on 
                                                 
43
 Egypt, perhaps for its cultural appeal or strategic location, was actually regarded as the Emperor’s 
private property.  Its governor donned the title of praefectus.  As the other praefecti had distinctly Rome-
centered responsibilities—control of the Praetorian Guard, the public grain dole, the firemen and police, 
and Roman urban administration, respectively—this was a noteworthy innovation.   
44
 Sutherland, C.H.V.. The Roman Imperial Coinage. 2 ed. 1, R.A.G. Carson. London: Spink and Son 
Ltd., 1984. 21-24. 
 28 
 
frivolous entertainment in 7 CE—an act more symbolic than pragmatic, but telling nonetheless.45  
A year earlier, he established a board of three ex-consuls to eradicate wasteful spending.46 
Records also show, somewhat curiously, that a fiscus was founded immediately in 
northern Spain under imperial control despite being far from any serious battle lines.  This 
appropriation makes far more sense to us when we consider that Spain had long been the 
principal supplier of gold, silver and copper to the Republic.  Any effort to regulate currency at 
this moment began and ended in the mines of Novo Cartago—a colossal complex that, according 
to Republican historian Polybius, employed 40,000 men in the second century BCE.47 This 
mercantilist policy in Spain strongly suggests that provincial reorganization had a certain 
commercial inclination in the Near Eastern provinces, too.   
Two bronze tablets from Aljustrel in Roman Lusitania (Portugal) demonstrate how this 
new provincial system both raised money and encouraged stability on a local level.48  In brief, 
the system was open to private participation under the precondition that all metals derived was 
subject to ius privatum; the unquestionable authority of the emperor.  Imperial procuratores 
leased to Romans the right to conduct mining operations in an allotted space for the substantial 
price of 4000 sesterces, which these conductores subsequently re-leased to laborers.49  Details in 
dividing up profits, such as what kick-backs procuratores may have charged, remain hazy—we 
do know anyone capable of leasing a mine could also sell his winnings at the highest market 
                                                 
45
 Dio Cassius Historia Romana: 55.31.4 
46
 Ibid: 55.25.6 
47
 Strabo Geo: 3.2.10 
48
 CIL II 5181. Peter Orsted fleshes out the details and implications of these laws—the lex locationis and 
the lex metallic dicta—quite well.  See: Orsted, Peter. "The Case of Mining in the Roman Empire." 
Cambridge Philological Society, no. 26 (2000): 70-76.   
49
 That this lease cost more than three times the annual income of a legionary—without any guarantee of 




price.50  The fiscus system thus both created semi-public jobs and injected currency into the 
market safely, efficiently and without senatorial meddling. 51  
 Mining precious metals was only the first step in reviving the Mediterranean economy.  
To combat inflation, a system of fixed currency valuation was necessary.  Augustus established a 
standard, yet imperfect, set of weights while maintaining interdenominational relationships for 
the sake of simplicity.  Monetary recalibration was a necessity to ensure commercial continuity 
in any region of the empire—it was particularly crucial (and, as later sections will argue, 
effective) in the Roman Near East.  Whereas the northwestern provinces, like Gaul Lugdunensis 
or Aquitania, had operated with far less monetized commercial systems before Roman conquest, 
the Eastern Mediterranean had a long history of currency-based economics dating back to pre-
Alexandrian Hellenic domination.52  But Augustus’s reverence for Hellenic tradition was second 
to his dogged promotion of Roman dominance.  The Syrian tetradrachmae, used both by Rome’s 
Seleucid and Ptolemaic predecessors, was ubiquitous in Near Eastern commercial affairs.  Other 
client kingdoms, like the Semitic Nabataean Kingdom, which occupied the western parts of the 
Arabian peninsula, had a similar silver-based currency. Augustus, in apparent recognition of the 
commerce on his eastern border, established a logical, weight-based exchange rate between 
extant Roman denominations and antiquated Syrian ones—from then on, one Roman denarius, 
or four sesterces, would equal one tetradrachma.  The business of merchants in the region, and 
their exchanges with foreigners traveling along Far Eastern trade routes, was thus made 
markedly easier.  By proxy, it simultaneously facilitated the collection of the τεταρτη by Roman 
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officials newly assigned to levy import taxes—whether this payment came in cash or in kind is 
another issue altogether.53 
More symbolically, Augustus ordered that all honorific coin engravings feature 
dedications only to imperial authority.  Republican coins featured the busts and acts of self-
glorifying politicians who, by political favor or simple coercion, were quite capable of bringing 
themselves fame and authority by the very coins they paid their legions or constituents with. The 
case of Pompey the Great, rival of Augustus’s adopted father, is exemplary.  A common aureus 
dedicated to him is adorned with arbitrary imagery and abbreviated titles that could not have 
conveyed much authority to denizens of the Near East, considering similar Hellenic coinage 
abounded.54  Previously, portraits of deceased ancestors and conquered foreigners were 
commonplace.  Pompey, regarded as a brilliant strategist, realized that coinage had the 
unparalleled capacity to convey authority to the masses, particularly when word-of-mouth took 
months to reach a destination.  Showcasing one’s profile on the obverse and embellished images 
of victory on the reverse was good politics.   
Compare the Pompeic coin from above with the common Augustan sesterius.55  The 
visual effect is both simpler and more powerful than crowded Republican coins.  The obverse 
features Augustus’s profile with the word, DIVI, meaning “of the God”.  The reverse features 
Roman laurels of victory surrounding the Latin, DIVOS IULIUS, or “Divine Creator”.  The 
symbolism is unmistakable when we recognize that this coin, and others like it, circulated among 
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distinct ethnic, linguistic and political entities in Rome’s newly acquired Near East.56  A 
Nabataean caravan driver could scarcely do business without physically handling the symbol of 
the polity that beckoned for his products.57The mere optics of Augustus’s monetary reforms had 
an ethereal stabilizing effect for the nascent Principate in the Near East.   
In demonstrating the importance of imperial intervention in the mining industry, Peter 
Orsted asserts, correctly I think, that “these innovations of Augustus therefore ought to be the 
general starting point of any study of the economic history of the Roman Empire.”58  These 
monetary reforms were subtle, pervasive and efficient not only in guaranteeing his imperial 
control but, more importantly, in laying the groundwork for vibrant commerce with the Far East 
over the next two centuries.     
So far I have argued that Augustus’s governmental reorganization had particularly 
pronounced effects on Near Eastern commerce.  The effects of monetary reform—both in tax 
and coinage—were felt by all Romans and provincials.  The effects of Egyptian annexation were 
more direct, bringing the province’s vast grain supply under Rome’s control, not to mention 
providing unobstructed physical access to the Red Sea ports that had so interested Ptolemaic 
rulers.59  Outgoing products could therefore leave from prominent coastal ports, like Myos 
Hormos and Berenice, without foreign obstruction.  Incoming products could be shipped to same 
ports with (after some caravanning) direct access to the Nile and the metropolis of Alexandrian 
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at its delta.  Accordingly, the emperor could directly levy taxes on cargo like that in the Muziris 
papyrus and, additionally, demand regular tribute for protection of townsfolk from nomads and 




 But how can we measure just how effective Augustus’s policies were with regard to the 
Red Sea-Far East maritime trade routes?  A numismatic approach is requisite to corroborate the 
more theoretical advantages that empire brought to eastern commerce.  The best evidence of 
imperial efficiencies consists not only of what Rome often imported—particularly organic matter 
and temporary-use products like cinnamon or frankincense—but of what Rome sent in return.  In 
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the case of Augustus and his immediate successors, one such output was coinage.  
Archaeological evidence from the Indian subcontinent shows the effect of monetary reform in 
physical form.  Extensive digs in recent decades have revealed a substantial record of coin 
hoards—sites where coinage has been found in close proximity and high volume—that make this 
thesis possible.  The hoards are overwhelmingly comprised of Julio-Claudian coins, recognizable 
in part because of Augustus’s standardization of portraiture.  Some 70% of the silver coins and 
90% of the gold coins are located in hoards dotted along India’s southern extremities.61  
 
We can deduce a number of interesting facts from these finds.  First, Augustus’s 
annexation of Egypt had an augmentative effect on trade with India.  The Red Sea ports he 
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annexed were, beyond doubt, the departure points specifically for southern India due to seasonal 
monsoon winds that made more northerly routes impossible. Comparatively very few Hellenic 
coins are found in the region in spite of the fact that maritime technology and know-how were 
the same under pre-Roman control.  It seems that Augustan monetary reform and territorial 
expansion dovetailed nicely, simultaneously furnishing private merchants with a better means of 
exchange and lower transportation costs.  This evidence also suggests that the Roman denarius 
or aureus was the preferred currency for long distance commerce.  The location of these hoards 
in the Coimbatore region further suggests that Romans in this period were trading for gems and 
pearls, which were a hallmark of the southern Indian peninsula.  Whether Augustus foresaw this 
trade escalation is difficult to say—but the actions he took had such profound effect on Red Sea 
trade routes that no subsequent emperor could be ignorant of imperial influence on matters of 
trade.  
What does the ancient literary record add to the debate surrounding imperial agency in 
commerce?  As previously noted, prominent historians in the Roman world mostly operated 
through the largesse of a political sponsor.  The historian Strabo was no exception, and his story 
is exemplary of later Strabo’s patron was a particularly powerful and revered one—Emperor 
Augustus, the founder of the Principate.  In his self-laudatory autobiography, the Res Gestae, 
Augustus makes certain to point out that he was the first Roman commander to receive formal 
embassies from an Indian head-of-state (most likely a local king from the Indus River valley).62  
Strabo predictably corroborates this claim, stating that a certain delegation from a king called 
Porus authorized Rome to pass through his territory.63  The Roman limites never came close to 
the Indus—but we can’t help but wonder what, if anything, the legendary emperor may have said 
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or done to “insist” that Strabo make explicit note of such a meeting.  Or perhaps Strabo was just 
relating fact.   
Either way, we can deduce one of two conclusions from the existence of alleged 
diplomatic mission in the historical record.  If this embassy did indeed come to Rome, we know 
that at least one (and probably many other) political entity not only knew of Rome’s formidable 
presence but also was willing to travel thousands of miles to curry its favor.  But it’s unlikely 
that this attempt at favor was politically oriented.  Any local Indian monarch with knowledge of 
Rome also knew of much more pertinent and worthy objects of political wooing (the Parthians, 
for example, who stood between these two entities)—particularly under Augustus, who had a 
somewhat tenuous hold on the Syrian coast after decades of civil war.  Mutual commercial 
interest is a far more feasible explanation, considering the history, albeit limited, of trade 
between the two regions.64   
If Augustus nudged Strabo to embellish this account, we know that the emperor felt a 
pressing need to advertise his knowledge and pursuit of the Far East’s wealth.  Just as with 
Alexander’s, Augustus’s messianic position in the narrative of Roman history—as father of the 
Empire, conqueror of barbarians and promulgator of the Roman standard—should be considered 
through a commercial lens.  Considering how all emperors thereafter would trace their lineage to 
the first emperor, evident in innumerous ways including honorific nomenclature, we should 
consider that Augustus’s claims to far-reaching contact was subsequently inseparable from his 
office.  
Whether Augustus influenced Strabo’s writing or Strabo Augustus’s policies, we cannot 
portend to know beyond doubt.  Though the interrelatedness between emperor and amicus is 
somewhat speculative, its applicability will gain gravity when we explore similar relationships in 
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later imperial administrations.  For now, it should suffice to recognize that eminent ancient 
historians and emperors often socialized among the same crowd.  Accordingly, in the absence of 
evidence of direct correspondence between them, we should feel comfortable asserting that the 
emperor had to be attentive to his beneficiaries’ passions as a practical matter.  
The reverberations of Augustus’s reign throughout the empire and beyond its borders can 
hardly be understated in commercial terms.  Through market-oriented reform, Augustus 
engendered an atmosphere of stability and unification in a region of conflicting identities and 
tumultuous multilateral relations.  He embedded a fiscal consciousness in senatorial bureaucracy 
yet weakened it by siphoning off its funds to his own hands.  He ordered the failed invasion of 
the Arabian side of the Red Sea after annexing the Egyptian side.65  In sum, he established an 
activist approach to imperial governance and defined how emperors could exercise dirigisme 
with profound economic impact: manipulating currency, spending public funds on building 
project, fitting provincial administration to the needs of empire and waging war.  That Augustus 
ordered a schematically logical convergence of these strategies in the Near East seems quite 
intentional if still imperfect.   
For Roman historians, Augustus’s legacy is greater than the sum of its parts.  How can 
we conceptualize the varying arguments above as a coherent whole?  Keith Hopkins’s “tax and 
trade” model has withstood significant scholarly criticism in the past thirty years yet it remains 
very viable, with good reason.  It holds that the imperial economy operated as a function of two 
codependent zones: “tax producing” regions where most public funds were derived (Spain, Asia 
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Minor) and “tax consuming” regions (Rome itself, and costly frontier provinces).66  While this 
economic dynamic between zones seems spot on, it seems to me that these two categories should 
be delineated somewhat differently.   
Lo Cascio has noted that “the model is predicated upon the assumption that the amount of 
taxes necessary for the state to finance its expenditure must have been small to allow the 
extraction of private rents.”67  Rent revenue, however, should logically follow the centers of 
population more closely than simple frontier proximity.  After Rome, the next four most 
populous cities were all in the Eastern Mediterranean: Alexandria, and then Antioch, Ephesus 
and Pergamum.68  Despite proximity to the frontier these cities, particularly Alexandria and 
Antioch, necessarily had higher tax burdens as collection points for the Eastern quarter-tax.  Yet 
they appear to have remained fiscally viable.  Thus, we should consider the possibility that 
western provinces produced tax revenue for consumption in Rome and peninsular Italy, while the 
Near Eastern provinces, with their lines of commerce and population centers, could have 
generated more than its own share of the tax burden.  Part of the value of the Hopkins model is 
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Vespasian: Building Peace on Roman Terms 
Now it is impossible to describe the multitude of the shows as they deserve, and 
the magnificence of them all; such indeed as a man could not easily think of as 
performed, either by the labor of workmen, or the variety of riches, or the rarities 
of nature; for almost all such curiosities as the most happy men ever get by piece-
meal were here one heaped on another, and those both admirable and costly in 
their nature; and all brought together on that day demonstrated the vastness of the 
dominions of the Romans; for there was here to be seen a mighty quantity of 
silver, and gold, and ivory, contrived into all sorts of things, and did not appear as 
carried along in pompous show only, but, as a man may say, running along like a 
river. 
 
--Flavius Josephus, de bello Judaico, 7.132 
 
If Augustus can be credited with streamlining monetary and geopolitical boundaries in 
the Roman Near East, Emperor Vespasian can be credited with beginning to bridge these 
boundaries physically, most notably through infrastructural development.  Vespasian (69-79), 
founder of the Flavian Dynasty, assumed the throne much in the same manner that Augustus 
did—after a period of utterly destructive civil war.  The Year of the Four Emperors, wherein the 
Emperors Nero, Galba, Otho and Vitellius fell amid bloody infighting, presented Vespasian, then 
legatus of Judaea and commander of the three legions tasked with suppressing the First Jewish 
Revolt.  By the time the first three emperors had destroyed each other, Vespasian had largely 
pacified the province when his allies executed Vitellius, leaving him sole control of the empire.  
While Vespasian symbolically declared his ascension date as July 1st 69, when the Judaean 
legions hailed him as Emperor, the begrudging Senate did not recognize his authority until 
December 21st.  Perhaps taking a lesson from Augustus, Vespasian defined his reign by usurping 
a bankrupt financial system and applying its resources to secure strategic interests. 
By the time Vespasian finally reached Rome in the summer of 70 CE, no region of the 
empire called for more executive attention than the Near East.  Though Rome had controlled the 
entirety of the Mediterranean rim for close to a century, costly preoccupations elsewhere in the 
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Empire—like Claudius’s invasion of Britain—rendered Rome’s governmental presence in the 
Near East little more than a foothold.  Emperor Nero’s extravagant spending depleted 
government coffers while undermining a stagnant Roman state of diplomatic affairs in Syria and 
Judaea.  The Roman eastern frontier was far too volatile for a laissez-faire mentality.  Insular 
client kingdoms like Commagene, Emesa, Chalcis, and Palmyra in northern Syria along with the 
Decapolis (a loose federation of vestigial Hellenic communities) and the Nabataean kingdom to 
the south were immensely important buffers between Rome and the increasingly bothersome 
Parthian Empire.69  The region needed a reassertion of imperial authority. 
Vespasian was uniquely qualified to respond to the crisis at hand.  He had commanded 
the Legio II Augusta when Claudius invaded Britain.70  His later victories against the Jewish 
rebels no doubt acclimated him to the turmoil of the Near East, as Roman forces in Syria 
continued to stave off Parthian encroachment along the Tarsus mountains.  A miser at the core 
(his grandfather was a tax collector and banker), Vespasian used his weight as emperor to garner 
funds in the most unsightly ways; nepotism and patronage were common, though more uncouth 
methods like charging entrance fees to public restrooms also helped.71  Suetonius records that 
Vespasian called for 400,000,000 aurei—a colossal, unrealistic sum—to restore order to the 
empire at large.72 
This dire appeal for funding raises at least two pertinent questions.  First, could 
Suetonius’s mathematical account be accurate?  The short answer is no.  Four-hundred million 
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aurei translates to 40 billion sesterces—we know, however, that the entire Roman GDP in the 
first century could not have exceeded 20 billion sesterces, let alone the imperial budget.73  This 
significant overstatement is most easily explained by the errant use of denominations.74  Second, 
where did the emperor intend to invest this budget?  Vespasian’s son and future emperor 
Domitian had already silenced remnants of his father’s insubordinate opponents in Rome’s two 
German provinces.  Its governmental apparatus remained in tact as indigenous tribes had no 
obvious stake in Roman political posturing.  Given the emperor’s background in taxing and 
soldiering, it is little wonder that he turned his attention to the Near East. 
Profligate imperial spending was risky business.  For every constituency appeased by 
Roman largesse, many more were insulted at being overlooked.  The shrewdly experienced 
Vespasian had to confront a tricky geopolitical dilemma in the Near East.  A military presence 
was needed to keep order—too few legionaries could embolden Parthian rivals while too many, 
as Vespasian knew all too well, could grant commanding legati a dangerous amount of power.  
But not all military influence in the region was Roman.  Maintaining amicable relations with 
client kingdoms was another slippery slope.  Rome had to balance commercial interests—
acquired through taxation, conquest or tribute—against the possibility of client and Parthian 
unrest.  Alternatively, too many concessions to local monarchs could leverage extant Parthian 
animosity against Rome.  This matrix of commercial-political contingencies needed a strategy 
fitted to local considerations.   
It appears Vespasian invested an extraordinary portion of his fiscus in infrastructure.  To 
that end, the emperor raised the number of legions from four to six, while distributing them 
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between Armenia and Cappadocia (zero to two), Syria (four to three) and Judaea (zero to one) 
dispersing their power and focusing their strengths on provincial concerns.75  The Roman 
concept of the legion was perfectly suited to stabilize the Near East because of its engineering 
culture that championed technocratic warfare.  When not fighting, legions spent most of their 
time making physical improvements to municipal services (canals, highways, public structures) 
and, if needed, taking advantages of these very improvements to swiftly confront subversive 
actions on the frontier.   
The archaeological record of Vespasian’s constructive activity along the Syrian border, as 
with Augustus, can be viewed as a commercial approach toa  foreign policy problem.  Vespasian 
probably understood the demography of the region better than most.  Any commander in Judaea 
would have realized that substantial populations living under Parthian influence were not loyal to 
Parthia by default.  The Arascid Parthians were, after all, occupiers much in the same sense that 
the Romans were.76  By streamlining the physical boundaries between Syria and Mesopotamia, 
Vespasian was effectively lowering transportation costs for Silk Road merchants whose profits 
had once evaporated from cumbersome taxes at each political border. 
A comparative analysis of two events from the early 70s CE brings Vespasian’s strategy 
into relief.  L. Caesennius Paetus, appointed legatus of Syria as an amicus of Vespasian, built a 
highway from Antioch to the Red Sea region in early 72.77  Later in the year, Paetus reflected his 
loyalty to the emperor by sending a written warning that King Antiochus IV of Commagene, a 
client kingdom of Rome, had been rubbing elbows with Parthian envoys from the East.  The 
emperor responded with calculated opportunism.  He ordered Paetus to invade Commagene and 
                                                 
75
 Kennedy, David L. “Parthia and Rome. Eastern Perspectives.” The Roman Army in the East. Journal of 
Roman Archaeology. David Kennedy ed., 18, Supplementary Series. Ann Arbor, Mi: JRA, 1996, 85. 
76
 Debevoise, Parthia: xxxvii-xliii. See also: Colledge, The Parthians: 57-76. 
77
 AE 1907.193.  For an excellent survey of this relationship, see: Millar, Emperor: 110-131. 
 42 
 
its ideally situated capital of Samosata on the Euphrates.  Paetus was aided by the armies of 
Chalcis and Emesa, two small states to the East of the Orontes—nominally independent but well 
within Rome’s traditional sphere of influence west of the Euphrates.  Vespasian’s days in Judaea 
may have taught him to better understand the relation between governor and governed in 
neighboring kingdoms.  Paetus encountered no discernible popular resistance—only 
Commagene’s professional soldiers stood against, and were promptly crushed by, Rome in a 
single day.78 Had Commagene’s population been concerned with political rule, we should have 
certainly expected violence to have lasted longer than a day, particularly with Parthian meddling 
in the matter.  But no such response ensued.  Engendering the loyalties of some neighbors with 
universally beneficial infrastructural improvements ensured that the region would not revolt en 
masse while Roman legions dispatched isolated disturbances, like in Commagene. 
Vespasian’s response to the Commagene dilemma does not reflect a militaristic ideology 
for three reasons.  First, we know that Paetus was restructuring commercial roads when he 
learned of Parthian encroachment in Commagene—road building toward the southwest is hardly 
a logical forerunner to military movement to the northeast.  Second, we know that Paetus felt 
obliged to ask for Vespasian’s permission before invading—it would have been quite strange 
indeed for Vespasian to appoint Paetus to an explicitly-militaristic position considering Paetus’s 
past crushing defeat in Armenia in 62 CE.79  Third, the Kingdoms of Chalcis and Emesa would 
have presented far more logical starting points for a grand strategy to bring clients under the 
Roman standard—whereas Samosata was some two hundred kilometers from Antioch, the other 
client kingdoms were situated nearby in the Orontes river valley.  The annexation of this 
kingdom, as opposed to that of the Egyptian Ptolemies, appears to have been reactionary. 
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This is not to say, however, that Vespasian was complacent with the frontiers he 
inherited.  His actions in Roman Britain prove quite the opposite.  Rather, the Roman military 
was to remain prepared and react according to the nature of its antagonist and the theater of 
conflict.  Capitalizing on the weaknesses of neighboring powers was a function of developing its 
territory to suit both Roman and indigenous purposes.  As the Near East was often characterized 
by the disconnect between ruling classes and the masses, this proved to be a particularly effective 
strategy.  Immediately after conquest, for example, Roman soldiers constructed an intensive 
system of roads that Commagene previously lacked.80  Bringing an area under nominal control 
was one thing, actually stabilizing it, another. 
Vespasian also realized that, in a region where political boundaries separated shades of 
gray as opposed to black and white, stabilizing the territory of a neighbor could be more 
advantageous than bringing an uproarious area under official governance.  A Latin inscription 
found on the Eastern bank of the Euphrates records that Vespasian and his son Titus financed the 
construction of an opus cochleae, or water screw, halfway between Zeugma and Samosata, an 
area that would remain firmly under Parthian control until CE 114.81  Seeing as how the Roman 
legions were stationed to the west of the river, this perk almost certainly was directed to solicit 
the loyalties of the locals.  Further, the annexation of Commagene gave Rome a permanent 
presence on the northern tributaries of the Euphrates, allowing for eastbound merchants to reach 
Mesopotamian trade routes and even the Persian Gulf with the backing of Roman authority.   
But a substantial amount of Vespasian’s internal developments are evident in areas where 
Rome had little to fear from foreign armies.  A year after the Syrian legatus Paetus retired, 
Vespasian appointed Marcus Ulpius Traianus to assume the improvement of public works in the 
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Near East.82  Traianus, the father of the future Emperor Trajan, directed the construction of an 
intriguing road from Palmyra to Sura-on-Euphrates, just south of Babylon.  The case of Palmyra, 
a client state long regarded as a crucial entrepôt on the Silk Road, raises some questions relevant 
to Rome’s engagement with Far Eastern trade routes.   
Was Palmyra actually part of Rome?  Modern scholars cite a singular milestone dated to 
75 CE as evidence in the affirmative.  But, as we just saw with Commagene, Vespasian ordered 
other legati to build municipal structures outside of Rome’s proper borders in at least one other 
case.83  It is a distinct possibility that he would do the same to garner loyalties with an 
exceptionally wealthy mercantile center.  Pliny the Elder, a close intimate of Vespasian to whom 
we will pay ample attention shortly, clearly was under this impression that Palmyra was a buffer 
kingdom to separate Rome from Parthia.84  At the very least, the discrepancy between our best 
modern understanding and our best ancient understanding reinforces the notion that authority in 
the Near East under Vespasian more closely resembled rounded topographical lines—concentric 
circles with Roman influence strongest in cities, dissipating as one moves outward—than rigid 
geopolitical ones.  While the political implications of Traianus’s road to Sura remain murky, the 
commercial implications are vivid.  Vespasian wanted to expand long-distance trade across 
Mesopotamia because he thought it both stabilizing and profitable, quite possibly from his 
personal experience in the region.85  Militaristic and ideological theories simply aren’t adequate 
to explain the motivations of an emperor universally castigated or praised for his miserly nature.  
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Again, Pliny insinuates that both Rome and private merchants stood to profit from expanded 
Roman dominance of the Silk Road.   
There are certain portions also of the frankincense which are given to the priests 
and the king's secretaries: and in addition to these, the keepers of it, as well as the 
soldiers who guard it, the gate-keepers, and various other employees, have their 
share as well. And then besides, all along the route, there is at one place water to 
pay for, at another fodder, lodging at the stations, and various taxes and imposts 
besides; the consequence of which is, that the expense for each camel before it 
arrives at the shores of our sea is six hundred and eighty-eight denarii; after all 
this, too, there are certain payments still to be made to the farmers of the revenue 
of our empire.86 
 
It would be strange for a Roman emperor to direct his military for the good of the middling 
merchant class traveling the Mesopotamian trade routes.  But given his military experience and 
fiscal pedigree, it is clear that Vespasian was not solely concerned with his fiscus. 
Pliny the Elder laments that some 50 million Roman sesterces are “lost” annually to India 
in the trade for luxury goods.87  Aside from the fact that this sum would have been offset by a 
single Hermapollon cargo hold, we should expect to find a substantial record of this coinage at 
the Indus terminus—especially when we consider that, like Augustus before him, Vespasian 
countermarked and re-minted century-old currency in the early 70s CE, presumably for similar 
commercial reasons.88  Alas, the archaeological record in India’s north shows very little in the 
way of coin hoards along the coast.89  
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How can we connect Vespasian’s deliberative foreign policies in the Near East to the 
overarching concept of cross-continental trade?  Once again, we should direct our attention to 
India.   
Rather than conclude that Vespasian’s reforms had little effect on commerce, we should 
consider what Pliny seems to have overlooked—the strong possibility that the 50 million 
sesterces were merely the value of total goods exchanged as opposed to that of metals alone.  
Roman amphorae—ceramic vessels used to transport liquids like olive oil, wine and fish sauce 
(garum)—are present in the Indian archaeological record from the first century BC onwards.90  
Sure enough, two of the largest finds in northern India are comprised of early Roman vessels 
made mostly Greece with some from as far away as Spain.  These are found in their highest 
concentration along the southeastern Coromandel coast at well-known commercial centers, 
perhaps giving us reason to question the orthodoxy that Roman merchants only traded directly 
with western Indians.91  Whoever was responsible for actually carrying the amphora, the 
evidence exists.  Amphorae from the period can be found along the southern tip of the peninsula 
in such frequency and volume that we can assert Rome regularly shipped staple goods in 
addition to precious metals along both the Silk Road and Red Sea routes.   
Another reliable proxy for determining whether this period was indeed one of increased 
trade is glass that, like amphorae, can be given place and time of origin with considerable 
accuracy.   There is no record of glass vessels made in India during the Satavahana period (100 
BCE – 200 CE).92  Yet the archaeological record around the very site where Mediterranean 
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amphorae were found, Arikamedu, also includes distinctly Roman ribbed bowls that date 
approximately to Vespasian’s reign.93  These pieces required a degree of craftsmanship 
unequaled by local bead-makers of the time, and their presence tells us one of two things—either 
Roman finished glassware was in demand in the region (as it undoubtedly was in more northern 
reaches of India), or a less likely scenario, Roman merchants actually founded a small colony in 
the city.94  Either way, the Roman presence is demonstrably more pronounced than it was, or 
could’ve been, under Augustus.  The commercial benefits of empire seem to have recapitulated 
themselves with time. 
We should not discount possible articles of evidence from non-archaeological Indian 
source.  While the subcontinent certainly lacked a Roman brand of political unity, common 
literary traditions in the form of Arthashastra, Jatakas, and Sangam poetry cannot be 
disregarded, if for nothing else than corroborative purposes.95 Moreover, there is burgeoning 
evidence that India began to develop a wine-consuming culture in this period.  One Sangam 
verse refers to, “the cool fragrant wine brought by the Yavanas.”96  Pre-Roman Indian sources 
communicate the presence of rather unappetizing yet intoxicating drinks—made from rice, 
sugarcane juice, grapes and other spices.97  Modern Ayurvedic scholars contend that these 
concoctions, first fermented and then distilled, are mentioned in texts as early as 500 BCE.  The 
vessels that carried these sacramental and medicinal potables are ubiquitous in the Indian 
archaeological record.  We can thus be quite certain that Indians were at least receptive to the 
notion Roman viticulture.  Cool, sweet Roman wine, as a vehicle for pleasure or sacrament, must 
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have presented an enticing alternative to palette-wrenching mixtures of sweet, savory and spicy.  
This type of class-conscious cultural exchange indeed may explain the beginnings of the 
draconian Indian Caste system.98  Such is the binary legacy of luxury—you can either afford it or 
you can’t.   
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But the archaeological record in India is nowhere near complete, having only been 
established for some fifty years.  Even more importantly, Chinese archaeological inquiries into 
trade with Rome, particularly in its western deserts, are close to non-existent.  This should strike 
us as a glaring problem. Indian ports were not the terminus themselves, but a coastal collection 
of redistribution points to locales far more remote than any Roman might travel.  For now, we 
can only wonder what the arid climates of China’s western deserts are preserving for future digs.  
Ultimately, there is little reason to believe Pliny’s numerical figures—that he commented on the 
woes of luxury suggests its prevalence.  Logic tells us that too many powerful individuals had 
their livelihoods at stake to run a losing enterprise for centuries.  Judging by Vespasian’s 
infrastructural and diplomatic maneuvers, it seems likely that the Far East was actually a source 
of wealth well worth chasing.  
In sum, the most salient features of Vespasianic foreign policy are strongly commercial in 
character.  While it is difficult to trace different product types to the imperial policies of one 
decade alone, the greater trend that we can see unfolding—increasing trade between Rome and 
the Far East99—required improved efficiencies that strongly imply Roman imperial agency.  
There were no other bureaucracies with the authority or capability to orchestrate the kind of 
inter-provincial development we find in Vespasian’s period—and private merchants were simply 
not organized to finance such a cumbersome task.  All the traces of a pro-commerce ideology are 
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Trajan & Commercial Conquest 
[Trajan] came to the [Persian Gulf] itself, and when he had learned its nature and 
had seen a ship sailing to India, he said: ‘I should certainly have crossed over to 
the Indi, too, if I were still young.’  For he began to think about the Indi and was 
curious about their affairs…” 
 
--Dio Cassius, Historia Romana, 68.29 
 
 Annals from the Han Empire tell a riveting story of a Chinese envoy who traveled 
westward in 97 CE with merchants to a place called An-hsi.  An-his was the Parthian state and 
Ssu-pin was the capital city of Ctesiphon.  The story goes that Kan Ying could see that Parthia 
was not the terminus of this trade route and expressed his desire to continue westward.  Parthian 
sailors warned that the sea route required a two-to-three year endeavor through treacherous 
waters.100  This was of course a cynical overstatement, probably with the intention of keeping the 
Chinese from discovering the fastest way—from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea—to Roman 
markets while bypassing tax-happy Parthian middlemen.101  The ploy worked and Kan Ying 
returned to Peking.102  
 Whether or not news of such Far Eastern emissaries reached Roman imperial ears, the 
Emperor Trajan, ascending to the throne two years after Kan Ying’s odyssey, responded by 
moving the limes eastward.  Commercially, the logic is clear if crude—cut out intermediaries by 
conquering them.  The next two decades were marked by militaristic and expansionist policy on 
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two of Rome’s most volatile frontiers, the Danube and the Euphrates.  Though hailing from 
Spain, Trajan’s awareness of and taste for the decadence of lands far past the Euphrates would be 
hallmarks of his travails in the East.  This mercantilistic logic was, however, more sensible in 
theory than in practice.103   But to fully understand the intent of Trajan’s policies must begin a 
full decade before the Emperor even departed Rome for the East, with the legateship of A. 
Cornelius Palma in Syria at the dawn of the second century. 
 The annexation of the Nabataean kingdom in 106 CE presents Trajan’s first significant 
Imperial accomplishment in the Near East.  Appointed by the Emperor a year earlier, A. 
Cornelius Palma descended from Syria into the Arabian Peninsula and encountered little 
resistance from Royal militia, effectively completing Rome’s control of the entire eastern 
Mediterranean coastline.   
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 How can we explain the invasion in terms of Roman interests?  In spite of Palma’s 
command over the VI Ferrata and the III Cyrenaica, there is little evidence for any military 
skirmish with the Royal Nabataean army, much less any major pitched battles.  The employment 
of a relatively small legionary expedition such as this suggests that Palma and his superior Trajan 
did not view the Nabataean Kingdom of Rabbel II as a serious security threat that needed to be 
preempted by Roman militaristic invasion.  Indeed, Rabbel II had just died months earlier after a 
36 year reign, bolstering the claim that the annexation was yet another example of calculated 
opportunism as opposed to longstanding ideological commitment.  It is worth noting that 
Trajan’s official title subsequently included Dacicus and later Parthicus but not Arabicus, even 
in inscriptions found in Arabia itself.104   
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 Rather, upon further analysis, it becomes clear that Nabataea’s appeal rests in the 
considerable commercial advantages it could offer to Roman interests—for both private 
merchants, and the fiscus.  Taking an economic approach to this Nabataean conquest, the 
benefits of the Arabian peninsula are clear.  Rome already held complete control of the Red 
Sea’s western coast along with its major port connections to the Far Eastern luxury trade, Myos 
Hormos and Berenice (these ports offer remarkable insights for our purposes, but scope must 
now be limited to the East of the Red Sea).  By annexing Nabataea, Trajan may have doubled the 
volume of trade the Empire received directly through Arabian ports like Muza, Qana and 
Eudaimon Arabia.105  Dominance of the Red Sea trade (which included, not insignificantly, more 
access to domestic Arabian nards and unguents that Pliny the Elder expresses wonder for in 
Book XII-XIII of his Natural History) should be granted primacy in explaining Arabia’s 
absorption into the Empire in the absence of any realistic security explanations.106 
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 A monetary explanation dovetails nicely with the notion that Arabia’s geographic 
suitability attracted Roman military attention.  Consider the example of Nabataea’s coinage 
value before 106 CE.  Whereas the value of the Roman denarius and the Syrian tetradrachma 
remained relatively stable after Vespasian’s death, around 91% and 81% silver respectively, the 
percentage of silver in Nabataean coinage dropped from an already anemic 42% to 20% in just 
twenty years.107  Indeed, its coinage had not been equally valued against Rome’s since Augustus 
mandated monetary reform over a century earlier.  It would be disingenuous to suggest that 
Trajan and his underlings did not notice this gaping disparity in values, if they did not understand 
it completely.  We should picture a number of scenarios that account for part of Trajan’s 
motivation.  If Roman merchants realized their exchange advantages and the Arabs did not, 
Romans will have garnered stratospheric profits from the aromatic trades—if past is prologue, 
then the Nabataean annexation is a smaller example of the mercantilist strategy Trajan employs 
in invading Mesopotamia a decade later.  While it is possible that Roman interests called for 
invasion due to monetary inequality and resulting inefficiencies, it is more likely that both sides 
saw advantages in annexation.  Roman coinage minting in the Near East had profound effects on 
a trade-based kingdom such as Nabataea.108  Submitting to the Roman standards allowed 
commerce to continue while Rome re-minted the weak Nabataean coin to have broader 
recognition and purchasing power in strategic mercantile locations like Myos Hormos and the 
capital of Petra. 
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 Also in 106 CE, Trajan completed a far larger military operation that is instructive of his 
broader approach to commerce, war and the imperial revenue needed to fund both.  The five-year 
First Dacian war—named for the region in modern day Hungary, Serbia and Romania—that 
Trajan led against the storied Decebalus required what was perhaps the largest single army an 
emperor had assembled since Augustus.  More pertinent to our task than the war itself is what 
Dacia stood to contribute to the commercial maturation we have explored in the Near East.  
Along with other Danubian provinces like Noricum and Moesia, Trajan recognized that Dacia 
boasted mammoth gold and silver mines that were largely untapped.  It is here that we see Trajan 
exuding shades of Augustus’s mercantilist strategy in the mines of Spain and Portugal.  But 
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whereas Augustus had only to issue a decree to bring the Iberian mines under his imperium, 
Trajan had to issue a declaration of war.  Trajan’s principal modern biographer, Julian Bennett 
has suggested that the emperor’s war in Dacia was punitive, unrelated to conquest or commerce, 
designed to reclaim the honor lost by two murdered generals.109   
This half-baked notion that vengeance alone could have justified two costly campaigns 
hardly requires corrective rebuttal—it is naïve to privilege perennially unreliable literary 
accounts over practical matters without equivocation.110  Rather, the speed with which Rome 
developed mines in the Bihor mountains at Alburnus Maior, for example, and their subsequent 
exhaustion must have been a determining factor before invasion.  The copious amounts of 
precious metals in the Danubian provinces would have been an extraordinary, even punishable 
omission for generals to make in preparation.  Given Trajan’s simultaneous and later actions in 
the Near East, it seems far likelier that control of these mines presented an opportunity to extract 
resources for future initiatives, if not for simple profit.111  Trajan surely knew that any spoils he 
confiscated abroad would be immediately transferred to his fiscus.  Logic suggests a mercantilist 
rather than retaliatory frame of mind; there was no doubt a legitimate security threat in 
Decebalus, but confronting him was a pragmatist, not emotional, pursuit.  
As coins are only one measure of our archaeological record, let us now turn from silver to 
stone.  Post-annexation Nabataean evidence shows Vespasianic levels of investment in 
infrastructure on the Arabian coast between 106-116 CE.  Trajan ordered the renovation of the 
Ptolemaic era canal from the Red Sea, through the Bitter Lakes, to the Nile, effectively 
streamlining the passage of goods to the metropolis of Alexandria from Arabia, India and 
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beyond.112  In this same manner, the fiscus financed the renovation of the King’s Highway (and, 
predictably, renamed it the Via Nova Traiana) that connected the Gulf of Aqaba (and its port city 
Aila) with bustling market places to the north such as Bostra, Petra (which notably was still 
autonomous), Damascus and the metropolis of Antioch.  Work on the Via Maris along the 
Mediterranean coast provided a more direct land route between Alexandria and Antioch—not 
coincidentally the two largest cities in the empire, save for Rome.  The fact that C. Claudius 
Severus had an unusually long tenure as Governor of Arabia suggests these projects were 
bequeathed to him directly and required his specific attention.113  Similar projects were 
undertaken in Syria to the north, widening the Orontes near Antioch for increased traffic and 
constructing bridges and roads not only in Roman territory, but also in client kingdoms like 
Edessa as well.  These were highly strategic routes, and their structural improvement must have 
been predicated on the possibility of tangible benefits for Rome.   
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Taken together, what did monetary and infrastructural development mean in the early 
second century Near East?  There are a number of advantages that commercial “encouragement” 
could pose for the Principate.  Trade within Syria, Arabia and Egypt, undoubtedly benefited not 
only due to increased efficiency, but because merchants were attracted to routes with Roman 
guard posts and protection from nomadic bandits that pervaded the region.114  On a larger scale, 
the considerable volume of trade that entered the Mediterranean region through the Arabian 
coast would thereby be subject to the τεταρτη, the 25% tax levied on all goods of non-Roman 
eastern origin.  Perhaps the only thing Rome imposed on all newly conquered territory was its 
tax collection—linguistic and cultural conventions, and even basic local governmental structure, 
were very negotiable.  The fact that Rome did not drastically alter a preexisting system, or the 
Hellenic nomenclature attached to it, suggests the system of the “tetartones” was profitable.  In 
fact, the Romans may have briefly extended the collection system eastward in this period as is 
shown by a Palmyrene inscription carved under Antoninus Pius (138-161 CE).115   Strabo, too, 
cites the tax as responsible for generating huge revenues for the empire.116  Trajan need not be 
considered a genius for realizing that taxation in the Near East provided needed revenue for 
Imperial purposes elsewhere—notably, wars on the Danube.   
Wealth, however, is not measured simply by governmental spending capacity.  Another 
motivation may have well been to enrich non-Roman denizens of a politically volatile region.  
Numerous small kingdoms that separated Rome’s eastern limes from areas of Parthian control 
included mercantile centers that undoubtedly benefited from Roman infrastructural 
improvement.  Indeed, given the breadth of building projects undertaken in the decade before 
Trajan’s Parthian War, it seems that the presence of Roman legions was almost entirely directed 
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at encouraging commerce while law enforcement was left to auxiliary troops.  Roman soldiers 
were again surprisingly active in building projects outside of annexed territory, constructing a 
multitude of bridges and roads within the boundaries of client kingdoms like Edessa, 
Commagene and Osrhoene.  
117
 
A remarkably useful letter from a legionary stationed in Bostra soon after the Nabataean 
annexation offers an interesting perspective.  Julius Apoollinarius, probably of the III Cyrenaica, 
states that around the time of annexation merchants began to arrive from Egypt everyday.118  
There is no reason to think that these traders stopped at Bostra, just as there is no reason to think 
that commercial products weren’t moving in the other direction as well.  Client kingdoms did not 
scare the Romans, as they lacked any awe-inspiring military apparatus, but their insubordination 
would and did cost Rome financially by interrupting trade and taxation.  Thus, these building 
projects seem to have had the tacit goal of engendering stability. 
What other possible benefits could Trajan have seen arising from these projects?  In 
addition to enriching its own mercantile elites, it seems very likely that the Emperor considered 
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his ability to pacify neighboring kingdoms through (seemingly) pro bono municipal projects.  
Road and highway expertise was one of a few areas where Roman ingenuity flatly outmatched 
that of other polities, especially the traditionally nomadic Parthians to the East.119  A vibrant, 
solid infrastructural base to facilitate the actions of everyday public life in these areas may have 
bought the loyalty of royal elites sandwiched between two empires—especially when Trajan was 
preoccupied on the Danube.  These kingdoms in turn offered Rome the use of its soldiers in 
subsequent defensive campaigns against Parthian and Dacian invasion.120  While fractured in 
political, linguistic and geographic terms, all people within the Roman sphere of influence had a 
vested interest in faster, cheaper commerce. There is ample support throughout history for the 
argument that political stability rests in the fruits of trade and prosperity.   
When Trajan came to confront the Parthians in 114 CE due to conflicting claims over 
control of the Armenian kingship, his expansionist desires were all too clear.  Conflict in 
Armenia gave way to a full Mesopotamian invasion, the details of which are too complex to be 
discussed here.121  It will suffice to say that Trajan made a fatal miscalculation when he 
envisioned his dominion extending to the Persian Gulf—after initial conquest, revolts in Egypt, 
Cyprus and even parts of Asia Minor (comprised mostly of Jews) drove Roman legions back to a 
Mediterranean defensive.  The incremental approach he directed in Arabia, tempered by clear 
attention to constructive commerce, gave way to an unsustainable quest to extend Rome’s 
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frontier by several hundred miles over diverse lands and populations—all while Roman legions 
continued to be bogged down in Pannonia and Dacia.122  We can only wonder what Rome’s 
imperial trajectory in the East may have looked like had Trajan limited his soaring ambition to 
Armenia.  His dispatch to the Senate in May of CE 116, falsely claiming that he had surpassed 
Alexander’s conquest, speaks volumes about his fascination with the Far East and his delusion 
over how to get there late in his life.123   
Trajan suffered a rude awakening from his Alexandrian dream and died with a whimper 
before he could return to Rome.  Though his concept of a coherent commercial policy was 
clearly flawed, due in no small part to special interests and delusions of grandeur, the 
archaeological evidence from Trajan’s war is instructive.  Ruprecht Ziegler has shown that 
before the invasion of Mesopotamia, and indeed during every major military initiative in the 
Near East, the minting of coins at sites in northwest Syria and Anatolia spiked to unmatched 
heights.124  This augmentation in production was directly caused by a need to pay the thousands 
of legionaries and auxiliaries at war.125  In a world of intermediates and client kings, this also 
entails an enrichment of Rome’s Near Eastern neighbors and the mercantile caravans that 
pervaded them.  Though Far Eastern trade may have almost ceased during these punctuating 
moments of war, its rejuvenation after peace was restored must owe itself to the massive infusion 
of Roman coinage into local and international commercial enterprise. 126 127  This is a lesson we 
must keep close at hand if we are to understand Trajan’s successor, Publius Aelius Hadrianus.  
                                                 
122
 Trajan commanded 8 legions in the East while a full 14 remained on the Rhine and Danube. See: 
Kennedy, Eastern Perspectives: 85. 
123
 Birley, Anthony R. Hadrian: the Restless Emperor. 1st ed. London: Routledge, 1997, 72-4. 
124
 Ziegler, Ruprecht. “Civic Coins and Imperial Campaigns.” The Roman Army in the East. Journal of 
Roman Archaeology. Ed. David Kennedy, 18, Supplementary Series. Ann Arbor, Mi: JRA, 1996, 121-32. 
125
 Trajan, it seems, was ignorant of inflation and the administrative costs of expanding the frontier by 
hundreds of miles. 
126
 Young, Rome’s Eastern Trade: 216-7. 
 62 
 
Hadrian & Redefining the Frontier 
Other traits for which people found fault with him were his great strictness, his 
curiosity and his meddlesomeness. Yet he balanced and atoned for these defects 
by his careful oversight, his prudence, his munificence and his skill; furthermore, 
he did not stir up any war, and he terminated those already in progress; and he 
deprived no one of money unjustly, while upon many — communities and private 
citizens, senators and knights — he bestowed large sums. Indeed, he did not even 
wait to be asked, but acted in absolutely every case according to the individual 
needs. He subjected the legions to the strictest discipline, so that, though strong, 
they were neither insubordinate nor insolent; and he aided the allied and subject 
cities most munificently. He had seen many of them,— more, in fact, than any 
other emperor,— and he assisted practically all of them, giving to some a water 
supply, to others harbours, food, public works, money and various honours, 
differing the different cities. 
 
--Dio Cassius, Historia Romana, 69.5.1-3 
 
When Trajan died in southern Anatolia, his heir P. Aelius Hadrianus was already at the 
forefront of the Roman Near East as legatus of Syria.  We can only wonder if Hadrian, having 
witnessed the successes and failures of his predecessor (as he was most certainly present at the 
beginning of the Parthian War), formulated his policies in reaction to Trajan’s indiscretions.128  
What is clear beyond any doubt, however, is that Hadrian was the best-traveled emperor since 
Augustus.  Hailing from Spain, he spent considerable time in Athens, Dacia and then Syria 
before assuming the throne.  Given all the time he spent traveling about the Empire inspecting 
the armies, it seems only logical that he would continue the legacy of Vespasianic infrastructure 
development in the Near East, albeit with a strictly non-expansionist military presence in 
Trajan’s mold.  Indeed, the Alexandrian historian Appian appears to be speaking of Hadrian’s 
fiscal and military conservatism when he wrote,  
Possessing the best part of the earth and sea [the Romans] have, on the whole, 
aimed to preserve their empire by the exercise of prudence, rather than to extend 
their sway indefinitely over poverty-stricken and profitless tribes of barbarians, 
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some of whom I have seen at Rome offering themselves, by their ambassadors, as 
its subjects, but the chief of the state would not accept them because they would 
be of no use to it.  They give kings to a great many other nations whom they do 
not wish to have under their own government.129 
 
This style of governance clearly resembles Hadrian’s philosophy rather than Trajan’s.  What is 
important, however, is that financial considerations are explicitly mentioned as determinants in 
deliberating imperial expansion.  The characterization of Hadrian as a temperate, fiscally 
responsible man is further corroborated by his affinity for his eventual successor, Antoninus 
Pius.  The Historia Augusta records that Hadrian sought out Pius for advice on all matters.  The 
anonymous historian then remarks that Pius “knew the budgets of all the provinces and their 
revenues very well,” suggesting Hadrian was concerned with frugality as well.130  These remarks 
seem to confirm Hopkins’s tax-and-trade theory: first, Pius implies that provincial finances were 
analyzed individually and second, Appian implies that tax revenue from elsewhere would be lost 
in annexing “profitless” tribes.  Knowing that Hadrian spent time as the governor of Syria, we 
can assert that his actions account for commercial implications—no small part of the revenue 
raised in Syria came from the collection of the τεταρτη from eastern trade routes.131    
Regarding Hadrian as a penny-pincher also makes more sense of his momentous decision 
to withdraw from all the lands that Trajan took east of the Euphrates, which the new Emperor 
considered indefensible probably due to the populist revolts that shadowed his adopted father’s 
conquest.  Instead, considerable sums of money were channeled toward improving the 
Mediterranean rim.  In 123-4 CE, Hadrian donated some 1.5 million sesterces to the renovation 
of the Via AppiaJust as we did with Trajan, we must ask what advantages Hadrian could have 
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seen in complete withdrawal from Mesopotamia.  Federico De Romanis has shown that the 
τεταρτη was paid in major market cities like Bostra, Antioch and Alexandria.132  As long as 
these entrepot cities between Rome and India continued to thrive, Rome stood to gain substantial 
profits from the quarter-tax—even if intermediate states watered these profits down.  It can 
therefore be argued that Rome’s ability to generate wealth from luxury good taxation was 
unharmed by the military’s retreat.  Administrative and transportation costs of ruling east of the 
Euphrates must have been daunting, and maintaining control of the entire Mediterranean coast 
was hardly a disadvantageous strategy to fall back upon.133  The former legatus of Syria would 
have certainly been quite familiar with this type of cost-benefit analysis, as our ancient authors 
have suggested.   
Hadrian appears to have been far more judicious than his predecessor with regard to the 
use of force.  Though always quick to make (and act on) personal threats, Hadrian utilized a 
disarming measure of diplomacy to build foreign loyalties in the ever-fractured east.  At his 
second “durbar” in 129 CE, Hadrian exchanged gifts and good graces with rulers of small 
Caucasian tribes along with emissaries from more substantial states like Mesene on the Persian 
Gulf and even, as the Historia Augusta recalls, the King of the Bactrians.134 It appears to be 
entirely intentional that Hadrian never sought outright war with any of Parthia’s weaker but 
strategically located neighbors.  Some Palmyrene inscriptions suggest he did the opposite.  A M. 
Ulpius Iarhai—a man who must have been given citizenship by Hadrian in light of his nomen, 
though Trajan may have done so while his troops were garrisoned in Palmyra en route to 
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Ctesiphon—is thanked by the local traders of Spasinou Charax on the Persian Gulf no fewer than 
ten times for protecting their journey to the oasis at Palmyra.135  More perplexing is another 
dedication to Ulpius near Babylon, well inside Parthian borders. These inscriptions confirm both 
the existence of private Roman involvement in intermediate legs of the overland caravan trade 
and also its extent beyond Roman territory shortly after Hadrian’s death.136 That Romans could 
conduct trade in once-and-future hostile territories bolsters the claim that Hadrian was well 
aware of the amplifying effects withdrawal from Mesopotamia had on commercial activity. 
 
The use of soft power by Hadrian was as or more effective than Trajan’s strategy for 
garnering the loyalty of the political entities that remained between Rome and Parthia (save for 
Commagene, which had been promptly annexed)—a strategy that, judging by all available 
evidence, had encouraging effects on commerce.  For Hadrian, owning the land through which 
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long distance trade passed seems to have been erroneous.  Rather, by controlling strategic points 
like Aila, Berenike and Samosata in Commagene, which Hadrian added himself, taxes could be 
extracted, trade could continue, and stability could ensue.137  In touring the Near-East, Hadrian 
displayed this very ideology.  The mercantile center of Palmyra is exemplary.  Visiting the oasis 
in130 CE, Hadrian certainly could have summoned the military force to subdue and annex the 
lucrative region, but he instead simply enjoyed its symbolic adornment, even earning the 
dedication of a temple in the Parthian city of Vologesias.138 Hadrianic Romanization in the Near 
East was marked by tacit attempts to encourage regional prosperity, if only to avoid costly 
conflict.  The relatively open border allowed tension to diffuse between polities.      
While an expansionist commercial strategy might have attracted Hadrian even if it was a 
drain on imperial coffers, other concerns prohibited a militant approach.  Hadrian, like his 
predecessor Trajan, had far more grave concerns in fighting Germanic tribes along the Rhine and 
the Danube.  The German and Danubian provinces called for an astonishing fourteen legions 
(twice that in the Near East) to stave off waves of enemies whose voracity and constancy made 
the Parthian menace pale in retrospective comparison.  Hadrian realized that the Parthians could 
be negotiated with where the Teutonic hoards could not—accordingly he struck a peace accord 
fairly early in his reign, sanctioning the replacement of a Roman puppet with a Parthian one.  
The Eastern provinces were a cash cow for tax revenue.  Declaring war over installing a client 
king could not be justified as it not only slowed tax collection but also required the costly 
                                                 
137
 It seems more plausible still when we recognize that elite Romans were thoroughly involved in 
commercial investments under the high empire.  Thus, the tax burden would’ve fallen disproportionately 
on the richest class—the masses would’ve had less to lose from the tetarte, perhaps explaining the 
relative stability in Hadrian’s reign.  See: D’Arms, John H. Commerce and Social Standing in Ancient 
Rome. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1981, 152-8; Pleket, H.W. “Urban Elites and 
Business in the Greek Part of the Roman Empire.” P. Garnsey, K. Hopkins, C. Whittaker, London: The 
Hogarth Press, 1983.   
138IGR III 1054.  Cf. Birley, Hadrian: 231. 
 67 
 
commitment of more troops from Rome’s primary concern in Germany.  Conversely, Hadrian, 
through careful diplomacy, could ensure the continuation of peace with Parthia and channel 
revenue to more urgent matters.   
This should have been a fairly easy decision for the contemplative emperor to make, 
particularly if we recall Trajan’s Parthian War, of which Hadrian was a central commander, and 
Ziegler’s finds regarding regional mints.139  As governor, Hadrian certainly oversaw the massive 
Roman efforts to increase the volume of coinage in the East.  From first-hand experience only a 
few years earlier, the emperor was uniquely positioned to direct near Eastern policy 
substantively.  He saw the effects of war on commerce, and how unsustainable expansion only 
prolonged and worsened Rome’s unstable predicament.140  The account I have here presented 
may not reflect the actual sequence of events but, lacking tangible evidence, is the only logic that 
fits squarely with what we know of Hadrian and the dilemmas facing Rome under his watch.    
Hadrian’s strategy in at least one other province is similarly instructive in that it is 
diametrically opposed to the efforts for increased fluidity between Rome and its neighbors we 
see in the Near East.  I am speaking of course about Hadrian’s Wall in Roman Britain.  After 
Agricola, an amicus of Vespasian, succeeded in subduing the Caledonians (Scots) in CE 84, 
relations with local tribes failed to normalize. Vespasian’s son Domitian had scaled down Roman 
operations considerably.141  Hadrian visited Britain himself and found that “the Britons could not 
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be kept under Roman control.”142  He therefore, “erected a Wall along a length of eighty miles, 
which was to separate barbarians and Romans.”143   
Why this isolationist strategy, and why here?  Because the Caledonians were barbarians?  
The Romans undoubtedly considered foreigners east of the Euphrates to be barbarians too—
ancient authors have given us ample evidence of such a mindset.  Or, because the tribal armies 
were too strong to be repelled by the Roman military?   
The Romans rebuffed far larger armies from Parthia on multiple occasions, even in 
Hadrian’s lifetime.  Mesopotamia’s population was unquestionably larger than that of Britain, so 
the security reasoning is somewhat suspect.  One defensible explanation for building Hadrian’s 
Wall is that imperial revenues in Britain, inextricably tied to the volume and value of its 
commerce, were insufficient to justify military costs.  Surely, the Caledonians were one of the 
peoples Appian referred to above as profitless and Briton was one of the regions whose finances 
Hadrian knew intimately.  We ought to thus recognize that, on at least some occasions, Roman 
foreign policy followed the perceived profits of regional commerce.   Applying this same logic to 
our understanding of Hadrian’s decision to not build similar blockades in the Near East, we then 
come to the conclusion that not only was commerce accordingly profitable, but that Hadrian’s 
policy was designed to ensure it was so.  Tellingly, Hadriana built the Via Hadriana from the 
Nile at Antinoopolis to the Red Sea, facilitating movement rather than constricting it as he did in 
Britain.  Similarly, Minor fort construction along these arteries is also clear under Hadrian’s 
rule.144  These clearly conflicted strategies on either side of the empire seem to reflect simple 
cost-benefit analyses.   
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Not all building projects in the Near East were warmly received.  When Hadrian rebuilt 
the Jewish temple in Jerusalem as the Aelia Capitoliana—a sign of Roman opulence and 
domination—he evinced the opposite response such projects were meant to engender among 
locals.  The Bar Kohkba revolt that followed in 132 CE, driven partly by the same aversion to 
Roman worldly wealth we find in the Christian gospels, makes all the more sense in a highly 
commercialized region.  This event probably also precipitated the stashing of another valuable 
primary document, the archive of Babatha.  In Babatha’s writings—which were notably in 
Greek, not Aramaic—we find vivid evidence of Roman intervention in the lives and finances of 
local Jewish provincials.  Babatha is taxed both in cash and in kind for owning four date groves 
after her husband died.145 This Jewish revolt, though precipitated by symbolic desecration, seems 
to reflect Roman commercial successes. 
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We have yet another sound proximate reason to believe Hadrian’s primary concern in the 
Near East was the promotion of long distance commerce; that is, the selection of his successor.  
Sensing his demise was close, Hadrian realized that his adopted emperors-to-be were too young 
to rule responsibly and thus adopted a senator whom he thought embraced the demeanor and 
philosophy required to maintain Roman dominance.  This senator was fifty-two year old 
Antonius Pius.  In the twenty-three year reign of Pius, it is difficult to see any substantive 
changes to Hadrianic foreign or commercial policy.  In Britain, Pius built another isolating wall 
80 miles north of even Hadrian’s.  More importantly for our purposes, Pius pursued no warfare 
in the East—he actually continued building projects and successfully sent diplomats a looming 
Parthian invasion at the end of his reign.146 In the end, Pius honored Hadrian’s dying wish to 
adopt Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus as heirs.  As we can see, Pius forwarded his 
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predecessor’s vision of both strong leaders and strong policies.  The Hadrianic emphasis on 
fiscal sensibility had staying power.147 
While Pius does not require in-depth consideration of his own, seeing as how he largely 
followed precedent, his reign remains important in that it preserved and transmitted the important 
Hadrianic vision of how foreign policy ought to operate around commercial concerns.  The final 
verdict of Pius’s success in this right is manifest in the fact that the imperial budget had a 675 
million denarii (2.7 billion sesterces) surplus when he died.148  The eminent historian Edward 
Gibbon, in his seminal work on the decline of Rome, referred to Pius as the “cumin splitter” to 
denote his miserly nature.  Gibbon probably didn’t realize just how fitting this moniker was.  
Cumin, a pervasive presence in culinary traditions around the modern world, is a spice that was 
grown almost exclusively in India and Arabia in the ancient world.  It reached the Roman palette 
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Marcus Aurelius & the Seeds of Decline 
Alexander, Caius, Pompey, what were they in comparison with Diogenes, 
Heraclitus, and Socrates?  These latter knew the natures of things, and their 
causes, and materials: And thus their governing parts were employed.  As to the 
former, what a multitude of things were the objects of their care?  To how many 
were they enslaved?  …All things happen according to the nature of the whole.  In 
a little time you shall be gone, as Hadrian, and Augustus.149 
 
 --Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book VIII, 3-5 
 
 
 Few monarchs in the annals of history can claim to have espoused, much less lived by, a 
philosophy that directly questions his or her ability to change worldly events.  Marcus Aurelius, 
the devout Stoic and last of the “Five Good Emperors”, presents perhaps the most salient 
example of an emperor whose great political power was matched only by the philosophical belief 
that such power had certain inexorable temporal limits.  By most any estimation Marcus was the 
most powerful man on earth from 161-180 CE, though one wouldn’t know it by reading his 
Meditations.  Whereas ancient monarchs of lore declared wars and erected monuments to grasp 
at historical immortality—to be the most famous king by whom history will measure all others—
Marcus embraced the teaching that his works, like those of Hadrian and Augustus before him, 
would one day be ensconced by the sands of time.  One popular fable holds that Marcus tasked 
one of his slaves with reminding him that he was “only a man” as he strolled through the forum 
among throngs of adulating Romans.   
 Marcus the philosopher exuded a disarming humility with the pen; he would entertain no 
Trajanic delusions of oriental decadence and Alexandrian glory in India.  But, as with the coins 
that bore his likeness, Marcus the philosopher had a flipside in Marcus the emperor.  His Stoic 
predispositions aside, Marcus was a king first and a philosopher second.  He had been selected 
                                                 
149
 Hutcheson, Francis. The Meditations of Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, Inc, 2008, 96. 
 73 
 
by Hadrian as an adolescent and groomed for two decades by Antoninus Pius, as caesar and 
consul, explicitly to rule.150  Pius’s reign was both a blessing and a curse to Marcus—general 
peace around the empire allowed the young Caesar twenty years to hone his rhetoric, diplomatic 
and historical aptitude.  But it also rendered the forty-year old emperor much less experienced 
than his predecessors in warfare—the threat and periodic application of which was so crucial to 
maintaining the fragile yet prosperous commerce between Rome and its eastern counterparts in 
India and beyond.   
 Indeed, when Marcus exhorted himself in Meditations, to act “in all things like a pupil of 
Antoninus; his energy in dealing with what had to be done in accordance with reason, his 
equability everywhere, his piety, the serenity of his face, his sweetness, his disregard for empty 
glory, and his determination to grasp his work,” he was expressing devotion to the Antonine 
sense of duty (part of the reason he was awarded the moniker ‘Pius’ by the Senate) rather than 
any specific military precedent.151  No such military precedent existed.  And there was certainly 
no Stoic guideline for how an emperor should approach war.   
 But war was brought upon Marcus almost immediately upon his ascension.  The 
opportunistic King Vologases III seized upon the chance to erase Roman gains—in territory and 
influence—across the Near East since Trajan’s meteoric conquest and withdrawal some thirty-
five years earlier.  Marcus’s dilemma of which foreign policy (and thus, which commercial 
policy) to pursue in the Near East was thus foisted upon him by realities on the ground.  
Circumstances called for swift, harsh military reaction.  Still, as we have seen with earlier 
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imperial administrations, we can decipher much about the new emperor’s designs for the region 
by his conduct of the war and its aftermath.  
 Marcus first saw fit to approach the Parthian incursion into the coveted buffer zone of 
Armenia as a purely provincial issue—one to be dealt with by the troops already concentrated in 
Cappadocia and Syria.  Cappadocia’s legatus, Marcus Sedatius Severianus foolishly marched far 
behind enemy lines to Elegeia only to be cornered and crushed by the Parthian general Chosroes.  
The annihilation of this legion, either the XV Apollinaris or the XII Fulminata, took a mere three 
days.  Suddenly Rome’s east was exposed to external invasion and internal subversion, 
jeopardizing the equilibrium between military and commerce that had persisted for the better part 
of a century.  The philosopher king’s dominion was quickly becoming tenuous, and no amount 
of laissez-faire Stoicism could repel bellicose Parthian ambitions.  However militarily 
inexperienced, Marcus was nothing if not contemplative—he took a four day recess at the 
imperial country resort at Alsium to ponder the Parthian question.  How was Marcus, ever a 
student of history, to repel Rome’s eastern foes with Trajan’s violent vigor and Hadrian’s 
diplomatic restraint?   
It is in these four days of deliberation that we once again sense the distinct relevance of 
the relationship between emperor and amicus in determining imperial policy.  Since being tapped 
as successor to Hadrian and Antoninus Pius, tutors of Greek philosophy and Latin rhetoric 
surrounded Marcus.  The most noteworthy, and the closest to Marcus’s heart, was M. Cornelius 
Fronto.  It was Fronto who cautioned Marcus not to lose heart in the face of early defeat along 
the Euphrates and similar building tensions along the Rhine and Danube.  The grammarian 
forwarded to Marcus a transcription of Cicero’s rousing pro lege Manilia wherein the famous 
orator called for a supreme commander to combat another Parthian menace, Mithridates, in the 
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1st century BCE.152  Cicero preaches about the importance of allies’ interests, the protection of 
provinces and the discipline of Roman soldiers—all marks of stability, Marcus surely 
recognized, that both depended on and contributed to healthy economic activity in a border 
region.  Fronto offered one piece of advice that seems to have cut to the heart of the conflicted 
emperor.  “Suppose, Caesar, that you can attain to the wisdom of Cleanthes and Zeno, yet, 
against your will, you must put on the purple imperial cloak, not the philosopher’s woolen cape.  
Philosophy will tell you what to say, eloquence will tell you how to say it.”153  We might say that 
Marcus interpreted this adage politically, substituting “commerce” for philosophy, “war” for 
eloquence, and “do” for say.  He sent younger co-emperor Lucius Verus, co-adoptee of Hadrian 
and a more Hedonistic foil to the Stoic Marcus, to personally drive the Parthians out of Armenia 
and back to their capital at Ctesiphon.  Just as the Senate had instructed Pompey more than two 
centuries earlier, Marcus resolved that there would be no war of attrition if all of Rome’s 
interests, commercial and security, were to be secured.154  Marcus realized that Roman stability 
resided as much in the continued health of long distance trade routes as it did in the integrity of 
political boundaries.  In any case, this correspondence between the weathered tutor and the 
freshman emperor is enlightening.   
Fronto’s advice proved worthwhile.  Verus whipped the Syrian legions, slothful from 
three decades of peace, into shape with a vengeance.  Parthian puppets were quickly expunged 
from Armenia.  Had Marcus only been concerned with Rome’s territorial sovereignty, he 
certainly would have ordered Verus to establish defensive positions.  But he issued no such 
order.  Instead, Marcus ordered Verus to spend 164 CE preparing a titanic assault on the Parthian 
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heartland, suggesting that Marcus understood the difference between conquest and stability in a 
volatile region.  Verus pushed eastward through bloody conflicts until reaching the twin Parthian 
capitals on the Tigris, Seleucia and Ctesiphon.  The former was sacked, and the latter saw its 
royal palace burn to the ground.  Parthia had been roundly defeated, and would pose little threat 
for decades to come.   
What is important for our purposes here, however, is not that Marcus successfully 
ordered the destruction of an enemy from afar, but that he was temperate enough to rein in 
vestiges of Trajanic ambition by halting the Roman progression eastward.  Then, much in the 
manner of his adopted grandfather Hadrian, Marcus withdrew his legions, ceding nominal 
political control to local clients.  Quite interestingly, he made an administrative alteration that 
was clearly aimed to maintain Roman commercial might without its political baggage—Marcus 
installed a logistes in the intermediate trading oasis of Palmyra, which had remained fairly 
autonomous, to oversee the city’s storied role in overland with the Far East.155  This is an 
uncanny example of a Roman emperor understanding, and acting in light of, recent history 
regardless of honorific laurels that may have come with the alternative, permanent occupation.  
The fact that Marcus inserted a logistes, not a legion, should not escape us. 
Ironically enough, Marcus’s successes in trade liberalization may be evidenced by the 
rapid decrease in commerce between Rome and the Far East that we see after 200 CE.  The 
accordingly-named Antonine Plague that followed Verus and his legions back from Ctesiphon 
had devastating effects on population and thus overall economic output.156  The general paranoia 
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that accompanies any market economy in crisis must have crippled Roman confidence in 
profitable commerce.  In physical terms, the resulting lower population meant fewer producers of 
wealth and a lower demand for products from the East.  That overall wealth declined, there can 
be no doubt.  But as the Romans most likely to die were undoubtedly of the poorer classes, while 
more affluent circles insulated themselves from public hysteria, the GDP per capita may have 
actually risen while aggregate GDP dipped significantly.  Such are the caveats of economic 
statistics in antiquity.   
Marcus’s diplomatic disposition is further evident in a collection of inscriptions found far 
south on the Arabian Peninsula.  The inscriptions speak of a treaty forged between warring 
Thamudic Arab tribes—two in Greek, one in Nabataean, and a bilingual inscription in both.157  
They have been dated to the joint reign of Marcus and Verus, and their languages of course 
reflect their audience. One bilingual inscription credits Αντιστιοu Αδουεντου, Q. Antistius 
Adventus, who was legatus of Arabia from 166-9 CE.  A Greek inscription attributes the 
agreement to Λουκιου Κλαυδιου Μοδεστου, or L. Claudius Modestus, his likely successor.158  
We cannot know whether Adventus himself was involved; it seems unlikely given his retinue, 
but it could have been something of a training exercise for Modestus.  But it demonstrates a 
policy of active local treaty negotiation in non-military situations.159 
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We are again confronted with the question, why?  Why were Marcus and his appointed 
officials concerned with relatively small-scale sectarian violence not directed toward Rome?  
Surely the rival tribes could not have posed threat enough to the Roman cities to necessitate 
distraction, especially in the midst of withdrawal from Parthia and escalation on the Danube.  
This gesture is more readily explained by a general imperial will to avoid the damaging effects 
such infighting had on overland caravan trade routes from Leuke Kome or further south in 
Arabia Felix.  Claims to control these trade routes probably explain the presence of intertribal 
tension to begin with.  These trade routes, the goods they carried, and the taxes levied on them, 
were crucial to funding more bellicose imperial projects elsewhere.   
These political goings-on were the subject of correspondence between Marcus, Verus and 
Fronto—quite possibly the best, unadulterated collection of letters we have between acting 
emperors and private citizens.  There is much more to unpack than can be adequately done in the 
space allotted here.  But the imperial relationship with Fronto speaks to how earlier emperor-
historian relationships might have functioned.  Indeed, that the two joint emperors were equally 
fond of their old tutor is begs for a brief comparison and some tenuous conclusions.  With 
Marcus, Fronto largely continues his duty as tutor and mentor, offering professional advice and 
exhortations along with personal niceties.160 
Verus, however, exhibits a demeanor more reminiscent of Trajan than his Stoic brother 
would ever allow.  Before the crushing invasion of the Mesopotamian interior, Verus was 
communicating with Fronto about the imminent writing of the war’s official history.  Verus’s 
vanity is breathtaking.  He prods Fronto to, 
Dwell at length on the causes and the opening stages of the war, and especially on 
our lack of success in my absence.  Take your time to come to my share.  Further 
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I think it necessary to make it crystal clear how greatly superior the Parthians 
were before my arrival, so that the scale of my achievement will be apparent…In 
conclusion, my achievements are no greater than they actually are.  But they can 
be made to seem as great as you would have them seem.161   
 
This shameless request for a favorable history should drive us to carefully reconsider what quid 
pro quo earlier emperors may have pursued with their own historians at particular crucial 
moments and, by proxy, what wealthy equestrian and senatorial authors may have been 
appropriated in return.162  We can reasonably hypothesize as to what a Strabo, Pliny or Suetonius 
stood to gain financially from liberalized commercial barriers, though others of their ilk surely 
owned lucrative mercantile operations in the Near East.  Direct cash payments are a distinct 
possibility.  Political appointments would have been a more alluring bribe, as the emperors 
exercised absolute executive power in the border provinces—Egypt, Syria (in all its forms), 
Arabia—that would benefit materially as the bottlenecks of thriving eastern commerce.  Fronto 
hints at such an arrangement in northern Africa.* It seems entirely reasonable, given the candor 
of the Fronto-Verus correspondence, to suggest this type of exchange was commonplace.  The 
room for convergence of powerful interests in the Near East is manifest.   
 Part of my task in proposing a commercial approach to understanding foreign policy is to 
dispatch the Roman historian’s predisposition that trade priorities should always be regarded as 
secondary, incidental or indirect.  Marcus’s most astute biographer, Anthony Birley, is but one of 
many historians who at times exemplify this mindset.  In opining as to why Rome engaged 
Parthia in a “consistent pattern” of war at “fairly regular intervals”, Birley posits, “There may too 
have been hidden factors, such as the need by Rome to keep trade routes with Central Asia and 
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the Far East free from Parthian interference.”163 I have shown at great length, in various imperial 
administrations, how intertwined trade and military were at this crossroads—it seems ludicrous 
to suggest that abrupt blockages on perhaps the world’s most used caravan network could be 
obscured, much less hidden.  The sheer number of moving parts in this commercial system 
strongly suggests that the standard Mesopotamian resident would feel the metaphorical ripples of 
trade stoppage before the actual vibrations of a marching Roman legionary arrival.   
 Consider a brief thought experiment.  Would, and should, Roman historians feel more 
secure arguing for the centrality of commercial purposes with (a) a comprehensive written 
explanation of trade goals from Augustus without archaeological evidence for it, or (b) a wide 
range of archaeological evidence across continents without a comprehensive written explanation 
of trade policy?  The modern orthodoxy seems to gravitate closer to (a) than (b), striking me as 
quite backwards.  The physical proof we have, in all its forms, eras and locations, would have 
necessitated some sort of periodic top-down commercial strategies to be so pervasive.  To once 
more call upon the analogy to Natural History, I am advocating a tenuous Intelligent Design 
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As I have aimed to demonstrate the reasons why commercial explanations for Roman 
foreign policy in the Near East eclipse others en masse, I will now review the development of 
relevant trends between emperors.  It is important to evaluate these findings through in context of 
the increase of overall trade volume between the Mediterranean and the Far East that 
culminatesd soon after Marcus’s death. 
 
Administration 
 Without question, Augutus’s 27 BCE distinctions between imperial and senatorial 
provinces was the most significant administrative change in the two centuries under examination.  
In the Near East, we saw that he brought Syria and Egypt directly under imperial control and that 
these provinces would have been the most responsive to the tools of dirigisme at his disposal due 
to their situation on trade routes.  But this was the first, not the last, “executivization” of Rome’s 
provincial structure.  Augustus later added a legatus in Judaea in 6 CE.  His successor Tiberius 
expanded direct imperial power eastward, making Cappadocia an imperial province in 18 CE.  A 
century later, Trajan did the same in Arabia, the Danubian provinces and in his briefly held 
Mesopotamian possessions.  Little more than a decade after the death of Marcus, Syria is divided 
into two imperial provinces.   
 This trend indicates that Rome’s political center of gravity—where the majority of its 
concern was focused—gradually moved east beginning with Augustus.  This was not simply a 
function of Rome’s expanding borders.  Rather, the complex realities of the region required a 
more unilateral authority than the traditional Republican system could offer.  Some of this shift 
can be explained by legitimate security concerns, but not all of it.  Executive provincial authority 
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also permitted expedited public works projects, taxation collection, monetary control and 
negotiation with power structures. 164 The need for executive authority in the Near East 
culminates with Marcus’s decision to send the first co-emperor Lucius Verus to take charge of 
the East, foreshadowing the future permanent division between Rome and Constantinople. 
 
Frontier 
 Territorial expansion in the Near East had both palpable and subtle effects on the notion 
of the frontier, or limes.  Trajan’s annexation of Arabia, for example, added a circumscribed 
piece of land to the empire with certain upsides and shortcomings.  But, when viewed in concert 
with other Roman possessions, it has added significance.  Control of Arabia meant control of 
both coasts of the Red Sea and thus a semi-proprietary claim to whatever entered its waters—
from Axum, Sri Lanka or whatever was out there.  In a sense, Rome did border the Far East. 
We see this same dynamic at work in landlocked Near Eastern possessions.  Over time, 
Roman territory became less defined by the Euphrates River or geographical landmarks than by 
its influence in commercial hubs that dotted the southwest Asian deserts.  It is useful to envision 
Mesopotamia as a sea in itself with mercantile oases like Palmyra, Bostra, Petra as islands, or 
even stepping-stones.  Interspersed between trade routes and cities, small forts could provide 
security and small markets in themselves.165  The argument for a limited, nebulous frontier under 
Roman patrimony is bolstered by the fact that we find very little evidence of popular revolts 
between Trajan’s failed invasion of Mesopotamia and Marcus’s demise.  This absence is quite 
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noteworthy considering the collection of historically volatile peoples with strong national 
identities.  Only a century later, the warrior-queen Zenobia led a violent Palmyrene insurgence 
against Rome that was strong enough to forge a brief ethnic empire.166  
Conversely, notions of boundaries in northern and western provinces took on a much 
more finite character—we find cordons on the Rhine and even more extensive ones on Danube, 
along with a succession of walls in Britain.  Whereas war became an end in itself in Eastern 
Europe, it was usually a means to an end—a commercial, profitable end—in the Near East.  
Ultimately, nominal control of the rich Near Eastern trade routes was secondary—the Romans 
seem to have been more concerned with the trade funnels, or the cities that channeled all of this 
wealth into the Mediterranean.   
 
Military: 
Historians have suggested that the two emperors that frame our period—Augustus and 
Marcus—presided over greater aggregate loss of life than any others in antiquity.  It is worth 
noting how strangely similar Rome’s military predicaments were in 14 and 180 CE, their various 
conquests notwithstanding.  Four legions were stationed in Syria under Augustus; Marcus 
commanded five between Syria and Syria Palaestina (formerly Judaea).167  As we saw, these 
legions served mostly defensive and preventative goals.  Both emperors had far more pressing 
concerns in northeastern European possessions.  Augustus was undoubtedly fixated on the 
Rhineland, where his general Varus infamously led three entire legions to their annihilation in 
Teutoberg forest.  Marcus too dealt with constant menacing incursions into Roman territory in 
upper Germany early in his administration, before turning to the personally repel Germanic tribes 
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on the Danube for the better part of a decade.  Constant border tension in Europe required more 
military attention—though, as I have argued, not necessarily more imperial attention—than did 
intermittent Parthian confrontations.  After 150 CE, some 169,000 Roman legions and auxiliaries 
occupied the Rhine and Danube; only 77,490 occupied the entire near East.168  These troop 
locations certainly seem to reflect the logic of the Hopkins tax-and-trade model.  
 
Looking Ahead: 
This strengths and weaknesses of the argument I have forwarded offer some teachable 
suggestions for approaching other questions of commercial history in antiquity.   
First, we need not accept that our incomplete archaeological record remain so 
indefinitely.  The sheer geographical breadth of this subject matter requires concerted research 
efforts not only in the Eastern Mediterranean Further, but much more importantly in China, India 
and the central Asian republics.  What great insights about the contours of ancient 
transcontinental commerce if Roman silver was uncovered in China’s desert?  Its arid Gobi 
climate does indeed seem ideal to preserve the type of evidence my research is based upon.  Yet 
we find very little academic resources devoted to Roman-Han archaeological studies at eastern 
universities.  Indeed, many of China’s prominent early historical texts have still not been 
translated into English—two thirds of the Hanshu, much of the Zizi Tongjian , and the entire Hou 
Hanshu remain inaccessible to western scholars.169    India’s extensive coastline leaves much to 
be explored in terms of maritime commerce with the Red Sea.  Studying the actual Silk Road 
routes is needed, though made increasingly cumbersome due to its trajectory through fledgling 
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modern states with deficient infrastructure.  Strikingly, the distance between Rome and the Far 
East in antiquity is mirrored by a disconnect between each region’s modern scholars today. 
Second, we should further explore what avenues influential Romans could follow to 
lobby the emperor for certain policy concessions.  Most scholars hold an uneasy recognition of 
nepotism between emperor and constituent, but few are willing to posit how this system may 
have altered actual historical events.  Lucius Verus’s correspondence with Fronto allowed us an 
extraordinarily candid example of the imperial side of the quid pro quo coin—what might have 
Fronto have extracted in return?  On a grander scale, how may have merchants—power 
individuals, or perhaps influential guilds—petitioned the emperor to act according to their 
interests?  Such questions are even more pertinent considering that the mercantile classes, 
stationed along trade arteries around the nebulous Roman frontier, were tied to local elites whose 
loyalty was so important to maintaining political stability.  Accordingly, it follows that foreign 
policy should be analyzed not only as a reflection of the desires of Rome, but also as a reflection 
of the desires of provincials and bordering neighbors.  If Near Easterners made a living through 
trade routes, then Roman foreign policy there was necessarily a function of commerce.   
Following this, we should also inquire as to why Parthian rulers, for generations, were 
fixated on conquering the Roman eastern Mediterranean rim.  Unfortunately, the Parthian 
archaeological record is far less decipherable than the Roman, obscured by syncretism with 
earlier and later Persian dynasties.  Still, a defensible explanation for their repeated incursions 
into the territory of a plainly superior military consists of an inverse iteration of my argument—
emboldened by their unfettered access to Chinese and Indian markets, the Parthians sought to 
establish a permanent commercial foothold on the Mediterranean and its proximate markets by 
intervention with client states and occasional war.  Perhaps they concluded that Rome would 
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withdraw due to the financial burdens of endlessly contested occupation.  There is room for 
substantial academic comparison between Roman neighboring nations as a way to better 
understand Roman attitudes regarding commerce. 
Third, and finally, we should recognize that writing a commercial history of Rome is very 
much an ongoing enterprise.  Recent discoveries like the Muziris papyrus continue to alter our 
best interpretations, and future discoveries promise to change them considerably more.170  In a 
historical pursuit whose evidence is so clearly subject to ineffable contingencies, we should not 
shy away from connecting the dots responsibly.  Roman Archaeologists are always one find 












                                                 
170
 These discoveries and silences communicate the need for economic models to bridge gaps in evidence.  
For example, it’s quite unlikely that the arrival of the Hermapollon in the Red Sea was a one-time 
occurrence—logic aside, the legal contracts strongly suggest the sense of routine regularity.  If analogous 
ships arrived even once per month, Rome may have derived as much as 4% of GDP or 1% of the fiscus 
budget from taxing Far Eastern luxury products alone over the course of a year.  Thus, this sum could 
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